AF 447 Thread No. 7

[RR_NDB]

Open minded

Hi Captain

PJ2:

but we may only be able to make guesses at the psychology of the flight deck in this accident and this is where we must be extremely cautious and respectful of the crew and of our lack of knowledge.

I understand your rationale and must admit, it is robust. HF (being addressed) probably is the major "component" of this accident.

When investigating something "different from our expectations" (i started to learn long time ago doing corrective maintenance in a powerful NDB (RR 375 Kc/s ) we must be open minded to all possibilities.

Your thinking (on why's) i understand is concentrated in the crew (unexpected behavior) and considers the machine "performed as expected". As a designer i always question the design. It can have 'flaws". Better when we detect first. Cost less.

I understand your thinking that crew actions were "unexpected" before and after facing the consequences of the "inadequate inputs=large stimuli to the plane, zoom climb, etc." An "entire group failure": PF, then PM and finally CPT being unable to deal with the issues and not showing any useful timely "response".

Considering the "effective aircraft" (Machine+PF) failed VERY FAST (degraded) without any "useful reaction" (showing ZERO resilience) and considering (probably) there are some (perhaps important) factual information we don't have, I prefer for now (as safer):

To consider the man machine interface "performance" as a possible important contributing factor why the crew failed completely (acting unexpectedly).

There are some reasons for this.

I sincerely hope the lessons of this case (all possible) are learned and implemented with no "trade offs".

The user wants to travel not just in "competitive carriers" operating "competitive machines". The user really need "Uncompromised Quality". Safety as a direct result. This is what the users expects indirectly (or directly).

This case, a complex one presents a great opportunity to advance further toward the objectives of every one professionally conscious on these issues.

IMHO the man machine in these "advanced flying systems" should be reviewed specially when working under "unusual conditions". Exactly when you need most it's resources.

With the information we have so far in this case we have reasons to consider this as a possible and probable important factor.

Actually the authorities should pursue this objective, in the interest of all involved in the industry.

I am anxious to see the results of the HF study and the role of the man-machine interface on crew (lack of) "performance".