Well,
Lyman,
I learned a long time ago, as a Metallurgical Engineer doing failure analysis, you don't have to look at everything at 10,000X to find the defect that caused the failure. Often, most failure analysis can be determined looking at things from a much broader perspective, 1X. Analysis of an airliner crash is nothing more than a failure analysis, crudely as it may seem in these terms. Honing in on flap & slat setting or spoiler activity is looking at the problem at 10,000X or greater magnification. You need to back off and look at AF447 at 1X, once again. The BEA has graciously given you a considerable amount of data to study and understand. It is what they knew to be factual at the time they released IR #3. Not every organization charged with determining the cause of an accident would provide what you have received as of now. So begin to look at what you received as fortunate rather than incomplete.
What you should be focused on is the 1X. It starts with this from the BEA IR#3:
The Look Ahead
Cloud mass reflectivity depends on the type of air mass and on the season. Cumulonimbus reflectivity is not the same in temperate regions and below the equator. An oceanic cumulonimbus reflects radar waves less than a continental cumulonimbus cloud of the same size and height.10
Gain, tilt and the ND scale enable pilots to adjust the weather radar. Gain defines the level ratio between the signal received and the signal emitted according to the distance of the echoes. The CAL position of the gain control sets radar sensitivity at the standard calibrated level of reflectivity. The equivalence in precipitation is thus associated with a colour of the echoes presented on the ND.
Adjusting the ND scale enables monitoring at varying distances of the aircraft.
Heavy precipitation that returns most of the radar signal may also hide another disturbed area situated behind.
Representation of the weather situation by crews is thus mainly linked to the use of the 3 setting parameters and their knowledge of radar, particularly of its limitations.
Onboard radar does not directly detect dangers to be avoided and has specific limitations which require active monitoring from the pilots and constant analysis of the images presented to limit the risk of underestimating the danger of the situation. It should be noted that, at the time of the accident, the presence of ice crystals at high altitude was not considered to be an objective danger and that crews were not made aware of this.
In cruise mode above 20,000 feet, a slight downwards adjustment of tilt, depending on the scale selected, is recommended so that the ground echoes only appear on the ND at the edge of the furthest distance circles. This method enables the simple and practical application of the height/tilt rule of equivalence providing the optimum tilt adjustment.
When pilots monitor the weather situation, gain can remain in CAL position. In the confirmed presence of storms and during their avoidance, a manual adjustment can be used for comparison with the CAL image.
A scale of 160 NM enables the change in the weather situation to be assessed and anticipate route changes. A scale of 80 NM is used for avoidance. Short scales must be periodically discontinued in order to observe distant weather conditions and to avoid an impasse amid the disturbances.
Red or magenta zones as well as fringe-shape echoes must in this way be by-passed from windward by regularly adjusting the tilt and the range. The avoidance decision must be taken before the echoes are at 40 NM.
The operator recommends avoiding flying less than 5,000 ft above or below a storm cell. It provides a formula for pilots to estimate the separation height between the top of a detected cell and the airplane. This formula uses the distance and the tilt points from which the zone echo disappears. Above 23,000 ft, it is recommended to fly more than 20 NM from these zones.
How did the AF447 flight crew manage their radar? Did they sense what was ahead?
The Beginning of The End
Neither of the two copilots formally identified the stall situation that the airplane was in, either via the aural warning, or by recognising the buffet, or by interpreting the high vertical speed and pitch attitude values. It should be noted that buffet is the only indication of the approach to stall at high altitude on other airplanes whose stall warning threshold does not vary with the Mach.
In the absence of relevant information from the copilots, reading the information available on the screens (pitch attitude, roll, thrust, vertical speed, altitude, etc...) was not sufficient in itself for the Captain to become rapidly aware of the airplane’s situation. He did not then ask questions that could have helped him to understand the sequence of events.
The stall warning lasted 54 seconds continuously, during which time neither of the copilots made any reference to it.
Despite several references to the altitude, which was falling, none of the three crew members seemed to be able to determine which information to rely on: for them, the pitch attitude, roll and thrust values could seem inconsistent with the vertical speed and altitude values.
The investigation brought to light weaknesses in the two copilots: the inappropriate inputs by the PF on the flight controls at high altitude were not noted by the PNF through an absence of effective surveillance of the flight path. The stall warning and the buffeting were not identified either. This was probably due to a lack of specific training, although in accordance with regulatory requirements. Manual airplane handling cannot be improvised and requires precision and measured inputs on the flight controls. There are other possible situations leading to autopilot disconnection for which only specific and regular training can provide the skills necessary to ensure the safety of the flight. Examination of their last training records and check rides made it clear that the copilots had not been trained for manual airplane handling of approach to stall and stall recovery at high altitude.
By the time the Captain returned to the flight deck, it was too late, unless he recognized the situation immediately, he didn't. What ever happened from there on was futile, there was no time given the situation.
So flaps, slats or spoilers , or not, they didn't make a difference when they left the flight envelope and were in the stall descending at 124 miles per hour without recognition of being in a stall situation. I would suggest you, one more time, read pages 87-101 of the BEA IR#3, carefully. You will see (read Pg. 94) they briefly deployed spoilers for 3 seconds before retracting them and it does show on the cartoons as
jcjeant calls them. Look at the bigger picture, Training (lack thereof), knowing the airplane and rapid situation recognition.
As for the final report, I think you will be disappointed, not every little nit will be contained nor should it be, only the pertinent data.