Learning alot I am. STALL recovery, SIM replication, Douglas Aircraft, etc.
STALL recovery from UPSET at high altitude was not in the Syllabus, and will not be. A back up Speed scale was U/A, it was merely an OPTION. Angle of attack indicators, or even a back up Horizon? The a/c was not equipped to prevent STALL entry, or recovery, but the Pilots must be? How's that?
How many faeries can dance on a pin? I fear that this discussion will lead some to think that flight test will soon include STALL. It won't.
That this a/c behaved surprisingly "well" whilst on its unplanned descent into the sea is beneficial to, whom?
The evidence points to an early LOC, one related directly to the lack of equipment that may have prevented the STALL. If the reliance to prove the PF solely responsible, how is it the PNF hadn't any solutions other than to call the Captain back from rest? The loss of reliable displays were reported to the Captain when he entered, how was he to help?
"Here, Here, and Here, we climb, so go down" Eh? Pitch? V/S? A/S? There was no agreement from the outset, and this is entirely due poor CVR? How so? The PITCH numbers are from the DFDR, No? Where do DFDR data display to the pilots? One cannot fly the Bus by feel, the stick does not communicate "feel". Every response PF made to ROLL shows a chronic bias right by the a/c. What was wrong? If he was synching inputs via screen, were the displays correct?
Who would know, his PITCH prompts went unseen, else the PNF would have not felt the need to cue him to descend.
Three clear graphics show the a/c, its responses, and Pilot talk. Very helpful. The third and last one stops just as Captain enters. No more graphics, sorry. Just getting interesting, eh BEA?