My 20/20 hindsight statement for the day.
Would anyone else agree that we seem to have missed a trick?
We knew the Vulcan couldn't disable the runway, which the Argentinians hadn't lengthened anyway.
The Shrike seems, however, to have been a master stroke. The radars were obviously supplying the Argentinians with surpic for anti-shipping Exocet launch as well as 155mm fire. They were plotting a rough position for the TF from where CAP and CAS missions popped up. They were supplying a RAP (of sorts) for inbound strikers and Tac AT. They were working with Oerlikon and Roland.
It seems to me that the RN didn't really consider a anti-radar push. If it had it would have ordered more recce. The anti-radar effort from the RAF involved all the staggering work that the rest of BB did - and would also give all the secondary effects that we can't really agree on. But at least it was a mission that could succeed - and in causing soft kill etc seems to have worked.
Question for the UK side of the house. Was the BB7 air burst plan considering radars? Why did we revert to bombing after so few Shrike sorties? Was it anything to do with the divert of a previous BB? Could a Vulcan carry a mixed load?
Any RN types care to comment on whether we did actually consider the radars a threat or was 'poking the eyes out' not considered? Was it another case of thinking they couldn't have got it to the FI - a la Roland?