'Falklands' Most Daring Raid'

[glojo]

I asked the question about how many days it would take to get all available tankers ready to support these BLACK BUCK missions and the answer according to Air Marshal Sir John Curtis was three to four days…

He also makes it quite clear that the greatest concern at Warrior was the vulnerability of the Battle Group to air attacks. We are then told that the RAF could offer long range Nimrod surveillance but according to this Air Marshal that required a minimum of seven tankers.

So what he is saying is that the biggest concern of our most senior flag officers from all three services was the vulnerability of the battle group however during the four days prior to these missions there would be no surveillance missions. He also states that whilst these missions were being configured, other aircraft had to be redeployed away from Ascension to either the UK, Gibraltar or any other suitable location.

When the missions were being organised I would like to think the meteorological department would be consulted to offer an input as to suitable dates where the weather might stop air operations against our battle group?

The greatest concerns of the Command Team at Northwood was the Task Force’s vulnerability to air attack and the possible attrition of the Sea Harriers, not only from enemy action, but due to weather and the other hazards of operating in the South Atlantic in the middle of winter………………. The greatest threat to the two aircraft carriers was from the few Argentinean Super Etendard aircraft armed with Exocet……………………………………………………………………………………..

Unfortunately our ability to replay the Vulcan card was limited by three crucial facts: the availability of flight refuelling tankers; the relative priorities had to be juggled between the demands of Vulcan, Nimrod and Hercules operations and the physical limitations imposed by fuel stocks and parking space at Wideawake airfield……… As we have heard these decisions required three or four days’ notice in order to ensure the appropriate aircraft were at Ascension and to redeploy those aircraft that were not required back to the UK, Gibraltar or elsewhere. The upshot of this was that only five BLACK BUCK missions were completed. …………………………………………………………….

He then goes on to talk about what these missions achieved

So were the raids worth it, I have absolutely no doubt they were, especially the first one, which sent a very stark message to Argentina. If we could reach the Falklands then we could reach Buenos Aires As a result they moved a number of their Mirage jets north to defend the capital which significantly reduced their ability to escort offensive missions against the task force. Had they been able to do so it would have made the work of our Sea Harriers far more difficult.

Please forgive me for marking a few words with a blue font but I thought it was the politest way to highlight just a few of the points raised by the Air Marshal.

Point One
At the time of this conflict I am quite sure the bombing of the mainland was not a significant worry to that nation, they knew and we knew that having bombers hitting the mainland of Argentina would be political madness? However they KNEW beyond ANY doubt that we had submarines just off their coastline and I would suggest that was a far more significant threat? A threat to any ship that dared to sneak out of their ports or maybe we had special forces embarked on one of our boats?

They knew the exact number of Vulcan aircraft we had at Ascension and also when they were taking off on their missions. They would have ample time to put up a reception committee without the fear of loosing those fighters, plus of course they would have early warning of their approach, so in the grand scheme of everything that was happening I ask myself how significant was that 'worry' about an attack on the mainland.

They had NO idea of how many submarines we had deployed off their coast, but they knew submarines were somewhere off their coast, they had no idea how close, or how far away those submarines were or what they may or may not do, and that to me would be a FAR, far greater 'worry' than the minuscule risk of their mainland being bombed by Dr Strangelove.

I would therefore very respectfully suggest the submarine 'worry' trumps the possibility that a bomber MIGHT attempt to get close to their mainland??

Point 2
orca has carried out some very in depth research into the number of Mirage jets that were moved and were capable of acting as escort to the offensive missions against our fleet. I am under the impression that this number might not be as 'significant' as it is alleged, BUT that may very well be me misunderstanding the posts from that highly qualified gentleman ?? (Question for orca to clarify)

What a significant number of posters seem to be unable to take on-board is the FACT that we are all commending those that took part in the BLACK BUCK missions… every single man jack of us.

We all recognise what went into the planning and implementation of these missions but are we still meant to accept they were the MOST DARING missions of that conflict… Note the words 'most daring'

The point keeps getting mentioned of how our flag officers did not object to these missions or even welcomed them, no one here disagrees with that. No one denies that our Admirals did not object to these missions taking place and we all agree that dropping bombs on the bad guys is good… Doing nothing is bad.

I have tried to answer the excellent point raised by Pontious when he states:

Just to refresh, actual BB missions were flown on 30 Apr, 3 May, 31 May 3 Jun and 12 Jun. Two others were planned with one scrubbed and one recalled. Hardly intensive operations that could interfere with the Task Force.

I could say, All we have to do is look at what happened four days prior to each of these missions onwards to see whether they were indeed good value. BUT to me that is so wrong as I hate with a vengeance those that use hind sight to try and justify their cause. The fact was that there would be NO long range air support from Ascension for 'X' number of days all based around the actual mission dates. I hope you can accept that as an answer as it all depends on how much importance we place on:

The greatest concerns of the Command Team at Northwood was the Task Force’s vulnerability to air attack and the possible attrition of the Sea Harriers, not only from enemy action, but due to weather and the other hazards of operating in the South Atlantic in the middle of winter………………. The greatest threat to the two aircraft carriers was from the few Argentinean Super Etendard aircraft armed with Exocet

Those missions did succeed in getting a few Mirage jets redeployed but the 9L missile had an ability of a different class that also redeployed those assets and would those few Mirage have altered that very one sided kill ratio?

Hopefully the RAF consulted with the Battle Group and explained that for the four days prior to each mission and until all relevant aircraft were bought back to Ascension there would be no long range surveillance missions, and no chance of any emergency flights to bring down stores or equipment.

Once those missions were completed it would be back to playing ‘Musical chairs' with all the aircraft that were removed to the UK, Gibraltar or elsewhere and get back to those supporting duties of trying to have some type of very much needed surveillance cover, plus the ferrying of desperately needed spare parts and equipment. We can only assume that this was explained in great detail because if a vital item of equipment was required then the relevant party was up the creek as the aircraft that was capable of bringing that item down south had in all probability been deployed 'up north' and would not be back until the other aircraft had all been redeployed away from Wideawake!!

Engines.
If an aircraft were to attack that runway at a 45 or maybe 35 degree angle of approach then how many bombs would we expect to actually hit the strip?

The RAF are the bombing experts and if they decided to hit that location those types of angle then I would like to believe a lot of thought went into that decision. I for one am NOT qualified to even dare disagree and I say that with the greatest of respect. To a lay person hitting that lump of concrete at an angle of either 35 or 45 degrees was pretty darn good.

In answer to a query relating to the amount of aviation fuel that was used then I have already stated that in weight but I would guess it would be about 1.7million imperial gallons and I wonder how much that would cost in pounds shillings and pence, or perhaps just in £'s .

This was an RAF mission, they were happy with the cost vs effect and that is all that matters, we all know where I stand...

We won they lost

BUT............I will always maintain this was NOT the most daring mission.

Congratulations to all those that took part and I am NOT criticising their efforts, not now, not yesterday, nor tomorrow.

Let's PLEASE not get personal and start mentioning names of individual pilots, it is annoying, frustrating and unhelpful. In times of war we have all seen that pressing the wrong button is not uncommon, it should not happen, we train for it not to happen, but the reality is that button 'A' often gets pressed instead of button 'B' and we loose our money!! (old wrinklies will no doubt know where I am coming from)