Gentlemen,
I've deliberately stayed out of this thread to date, mainly to see what got said, and also to do some research with key participants (and I mean very senior key participants).
To start, Black Buck was a considerable feat of airmanship. To get a Vulcan over a target over that range was a brave and highly skilled piece of planning and flying. The RAF crews that took part deserve much credit for what they did. These are, I hope, indisputable conclusions.
However, it's my view (and by all means feel free to disagree) that these basic facts have become obscured by some regrettable attempts to overemphasise and overstate the effect and impact of the Black Buck raids. It's been claimed here and in other publications that the RN requested the raids, and that the RAF went along reluctantly. That's not true. The C4 trail asserts that Black Buck 'changed the outcome of the war' and that the safety of the Task Force 'depended on its success'. That's not true. Roland White's book makes similar claims that the missions 'achieved all their objectives' and goes on to claim that they directly led to the sinking of the Belgrano and the withdrawal of 'all Argentinian Mirage aircraft' to defend the mainland. To this day, the RAF's own website asserts that the raids 'placed a bomb in the centre of the runway'. It's not true.
Here's my conclusions, based on evidence from those in positions of command at the time, and in other positions of first hand observation. I'd also add that I was serving in 'Invincible' at the time.
Black Buck was an RAF initiative. The Task force Commander had, quite rightly, identified that any Argentinian move to base fast jets at Stanley would be a severe threat. Because of this, he decided that a combined operation was required at the outset of the war to deter any move to do so. The combined operation planned for 1st May against Port Stanley included a substantial Sea Harrier bombing effort, and also naval gunfire support. Very early on in the planning, the RAF (I understand, from witnesses, that it was Beetham) put forward the idea of adding a Vulcan raid from Ascension. The RN Task Force Commander accepted this offer with gratitude, and even defended it against some opposition from his own aviation advisers. To me, this appears to have been a sensible and realistic move - hit Stanley with as much 'stuff' as the UK could generate to stop any chance of fast jets getting based there.
So, the Black Buck raid on the 1st May was one part of a combined operation. There is no doubt that the aim was to hit the runway - no other aiming point makes sense given the bomb load. The fact (and it's indisputable from the first recce photographs) is that the stick (quite rightly aimed at cutting the runway at a 45 degree angle) essentially missed by about 500 yards. The first bomb in the stick hit the runway near the edge, the other 20 dropped well clear. The bomb did not hit 'in the centre', and it's unfortunate that some photos used since then (including the one on the RAF website) do not line up with the authoritative photos taken by the Task Force just after the raid.
The second bombing raid on 3rd/4th May was a complete failure, since the crew failed to arm the bombs before release and dropped 21 'duds'. This fact is omitted from 'Vulcan 607', which somewhat misleadingly limits its account to a single sentence saying that a crew 'got their chance on 3 May'.
The last bombing raid, on 12th June, also missed the runway. The photograph on the RAF website actually crops out the craters from this stick. The RAF's website account of these three raids is unclear at best, misleading at worst.
I can't, in all honesty, see that 1 bomb in the target area (the runway) from 63 bombs dropped represents a military success, and one has to conclude that the Vulcans' bomb aiming systems were not up to the task.
The airstrip continued to be used by the Argentinians without any major issues. However, the combined operation of May 1st (of which Black Buck was a part) certainly deterred any Argentinian move to base fast jets at Stanley, if it existed at all.
Some of the subsequent speculation on the impact of 'Black Buck' is again, in my view, aimed at trying to justify the raids against the lack of direct success. There's some evidence of minor reallocation of Arg AD assets, but there was never any serious planning to hit the Argentinian mainland (and I remember the Op Corporate ROEs with some clarity on that point).
Yes, it helped dent Arg morale. First hand accounts from those on the islands confirm that, but place as much if not more emphasis on the naval gunfire which happened at Stanley on a fairly regular basis.
In sum, I stick by my conclusions, which are:
1. The RAF were desperate to be seen to contributing to a war in which, due to the basics of range and absence of land bases, they were unable to participate in a direct combat role.(I'd add that their C-130 resupply flights were extremely important to the operation)(I haven't forgotten 1 Sqn, but they weren't there on 1 May - see my other posts on their professionalism)
2. Black Buck gave the RAF a way to be seen to be contributing operationally.
3. Their inclusion in the raids of 1st May and afterwards by the Task Force Commander was militarily sensible - why turn down an asset?
4. In the end, the actual military value of Black Buck bombing missions was marginal, due to inaccurate bomb delivery and the risks inherent in long range missions depending on a number of AAR events. Many sorties were cancelled or aborted. Sadly, a number of people have since overstated their effect. So has the RAF, and they continue to do so to this day. They should stop doing so.
5. The indirect military effects of Black Buck are probably less than have been claimed. In the end, the only thing that really mattered was direct action around, on and above the Falklands. The biggest blows to Arg morale were most probably the sinking of the Belgrano and the overwhelming ascendancy of the Sea Harriers. However, this is open to conjecture. Others can differ, and will probably do so.
6. What is not open to conjecture (in my view) is that the 'Black Buck' crews were brave, skilled and daring in carrying out a series of very long range sorties. They certainly deserved recognition and congratulation, and still do so.
Best Regards as ever,
Engines