Originally Posted by
orca
Hello everyone.
Pre-amble: I was nothing more than a fascinated school boy at the time but my admiration for the FRS 1, GR3 and Vulcan aircrew has always been stratospheric. So much so that you can probably trace my career back to watching the jets depart Yeovilton to go south.
I buy the plausibility of the Argentines moving assets to defend the homeland as a result of Blackbuck. But I also know that the Argentine radar unit (VYCA-2 from memory) saw the first inbound raid, and they could all count bombs, and see that it was single stick stuff, so they would have known that all we could muster at that range was a single bomber. They would also know what accuracy it was capable of - and could have made an informed decision on whether or not it would be used in downtown BA. I personally don't think that this would significantly alter strategic thinking.
As I've noted elsewhere on PPrune, Admirals Leach, Lewin and Fieldhouse, subsequently supported by Admiral Woodward were keen on the idea of Blakcbuck because it would keep the Argentines guessing. This is a matter of public record (the seminar at the Staff College in 2002 at which Admiral Leach revealed that he was a bit more enthusiastic about the raid than MRAF Beetham, a point supported by the latter, who was also present). It didn't mater whether the Argentines thought we might come with one Vulcan or a bomber stream, the point was the possible effect of bombs landing on the mainland.
Do we have any proof that the Argentines planned to use Stanley for fighters throughout the conflict but changed the plan as a result of Blackbuck?
There is some evidence that they offloaded PSP to extend the runway from their first lift of stores to the islands, and post-Blackbuck never bothered to put it back onto a ship.
Do we have any proof that aircraft types were taken from OCA/ strike/ ASuW and made to do DCA of the mainland instead?
Yes - the source being the Argentines themselves. The Mirages of 8 Grupo had additional DCA taskings added; this reduced their ability to fly sweeps over the islands even further - as well as lack of persistence, lack of numbers became an issue.
Did the Argentines really believe the UK would go nuclear over the FI?
No. There was no desire that they should think that we would - the issue (as above) was getting them to worry that Mrs T might be mad enough to have Vulcan rock up over the mainland dispensing HE, with major consequences for opinion towards the junta.
Does anyone have any Argentine input? Documented squadron moves, ATO changes (I know - ATO existence doubtful...but you get the point), briefing boards etc etc?
Please enlighten me, I would be very interested.
There is some input from Argentine veterans into a couple of sources, notably Martin Middlebrook's book on the Argentine experience of the war which tends to support the view that BB1 contributed to a reduction in Mirage III OCA sorties until late May 82 (by which point the Argentines had concluded that we weren't going to raid the mainland).