Top brass from the aviation industry have been named as accused in a complaint filed in the court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) II at Mangalore in connection with the crash of flight IX 812 from Dubai on May 22, 2010 in which 158 lives were lost.
The complaint filed by the 812 Foundation, a trust formed by advocates Yeshwanth Shenoy and Nayana Pai with Triveni Kodkany who lost her mother and husband in the crash to help the victims and bring the guilty to book, names top officials of Air India Limited, Airport Authority of India (AAI) and the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA).
It alleges that Capt Glusica, who was the commander of flight IX 812, did not meet the eligibility criteria for a Foreign Air Crew Temporary Authorisation (FATA) licence. The DGCA, which is primarily responsible for issuing licences, allegedly failed to verify the Airline Transport Pilot Licence (ATPL) and log book of the pilot-in-command before issuing the FATA licence.
Capt Glusica obtained his B-737-800/900 endorsement on May 22, 2008 and joined Air India Express (AIE) (AIE) on December 15, 2008 during which period he did not fly this type of aircraft. When AIE applied for his FATA, he did not have the 100 hrs on type (B-737-800). Despite this, the DGCA approved the FATA violating section 6, Part V & Schedule II of Aircraft Rules, 1937.
The complaint also maintains that Air India did not provide mandatory cockpit training to most of its international flight crew for over two years, violating regulatory norms. DGCA circular No. 8 of 2009 and CAR mandates Crew Resource Management (CRM) training every year. The Court of Inquiry (COI) report clearly points out inadequate CRM as having played a significant role in the accident. This is acknowledged in an e-mail dated June 3, 2011, written by A S Soman, executive director (operations and customer service) addressed to Arvind Jadhav, former CMD, Air India Express.
Lapses at bajpe airport
The complaint quotes a writ petition filed in the Karnataka High Court in 1997 in which it was stated, “Minimum area for stop way is clearly insufficient. The runway distance itself is about 2,400 metres, and even if the area left is most cautiously utilised, what is left is only about 300 metres on each end of the runway. By the prescribed standard, this is far below the required distance needed for an emergency stop way.
“Therefore, the chances of an aircraft that has achieved the decision speed forcing an emergency stop are critically minimised, and the inevitable consequence could be that the plane would come crashing down the hill side from a height of 80-100 metres on either side of the proposed runway.” The Mangalore crash replicated this pattern.
It is further alleged that markings on the runway are wrong. The markings show the availability of 2000 feet of runway when there was actually none available. It is exactly at this point that the pilot made the decision to take off again
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