The second pull to 17 was accomplished by a pilot who had done that before, and not experienced any fatal result. He was repeating what the a/c and the UAS drill taught and were teaching. Pull, TOGA. It's in the book, and not contra indicated. Remember the "second Pull to 17" happened just after the STALL WARN blared, as it had before. Duff speeds? Is it Real?
Because it defeated a stable attitude is IRRELEVANT. You and I know that, but PF's screen was not recorded, remember? Did he purposely leave a stable attitude, only to STALL? I suggest, not on purpose.
A33Zab. Thank you, yes the ECAM. What is more important to a flying pilot, his instruments? His duty to the ECAM and fault resolution? An interesting discussion? Where should the cue appear? On ECAM, along with dozens of other bitches, or on the life and death of what he knows the a/c is doing?
In a very real way, there is a built in conflict on this flightdeck, if only "philosophical". Get out the book, address each warning, alert, team the return to unannunciated complaints? Or handle the a/c? There was little CRM, if any, shall the PF do it all, or must he choose? PFD? The fact that at any given time in this four minutes a plan and some teaming would have helped, the confusion was inconquerable, each opportunity ignored, misunderstood, or wasted.
imo