paull;
Re, "1> I know that prior to AF447 the pitot-icing had already been identified and there were steps in place to change the sensors, but was any action taken to introduce this scenario into sim. flights so that we could assess what proportion of pilots would get it right?"
Yes, such training was planned and done as part of AFs recurrent briefings and simulator training curriculae for 2008/2009.
The BEA Second Interim Report, Section 1.17 Information on Organisations and Management, provides specific information on this and the previous section, 1.16 Tests and Research discusses the thirteen previous UAS events which had sufficient data such that adequate studies could be undertaken of the phenomenon.
Oddly, of the 36 UAS Events listed in Appendix 7 of this Report which occurred to the A330 up to the day of the accident and during the recurrent training period, only two were not in cruise* yet the UAS script was for the right-after-takeoff phase which of course is the most critical phase of flight.
The briefing notes for the exercise indicate that if the ADRs are not rejected and the FCPCs and FCSCs continue to use the incorrect information, the crew will have to:
" Trigger the emergency manoeuvre(15) if they consider control of the flight
is dangerously affected (initial climb, go-around, etc.);
" Trigger the Flight QRH procedure with UAS / ADR check if the trajectory
has been stabilised and flight is under control." **
*one event was on descent (FL290) and the other event was on approach.
** p54, BEA Second Interim Report, English version