HHi RR NDB.
I would suggest further, that in this particular case, had only ONE Pitot tube been installed, the outcome may have been different.
One only need review the computers trail, the Pilots' confusion, and the lack of a co-ordinated plan to conclude that in this case, had the system failed completely, directly, (and REJECTED, with prejudice) in transient fashion, a single probe would have come back alive and been correct, no "voting", no indecision?
The AS system here seems over-reliant on decision making made at the electronic level, excluding the handling pilots, and causing delay.
At the least, had a separate "system" been installed, one that had a shrouded probe that came alive when the first failed, a new and reliable sense of AS would be available.
The focus on redundancy is a fool's errand, when a "sequential system(s)" is a separate and independent source. Even BUSS fills this need, a separate system, one that can replace indefinitely a system that causes problems whilst one waits for it to become reliable.
The longer these UAS events pertain, the more foolish the authority appears.