At/PJ, is hindsight bias is enhancing emotion?
Those who wish to prosecute ‘deviant’ crews without all of the evidence (because many cognitive aspects are not available), should consider what aspects of safety could be learnt from alternative viewpoints. Try being the defense lawyer.
There is much that we (industry / humans) do not understand about human behavior, particularly in the interactions present in modern, complex operations.
For an alternative view of LEX, see
http://ida.dk/netvaerk/fagtekniskene...l%20040210.pdf and
Application of Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) to - rossir24-0004
Anyone care to speculate about alternative contributions to this B738 accident and possible interactions:
Pilot selection, personality (prone to deviation – done it before do it again), training, operational procedure, regulatory oversight, data monitoring, cognitive processes; … … monitoring and intervention – do these really work.
The surrounding infrastructure, organization, and operational situation probably had greater influence than any ‘legal’ human behavior.
Consider all of the successful (not necessarily safe) landings in similar circumstances, what contributed to the successful outcome, what contributes to being safe?