PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - AF447 final crew conversation - Thread No. 1
Old 20th Feb 2012, 19:27
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RR_NDB
 
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Human machine interface and the K.I.S.S. principle

Hi,

Organfreak,

...were a part and parcel of their lack of situational awareness.
Leonardo da Vinci: Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication.
Antagonic factors poses important challenges to the design of the “interface" in complex Systems.

CRM, developed after DC8-61 flight 173 in Portland is IMO closely related to the interface design challenge:

1) What is happening? (relatively simple to present)
2) Which are the priorities (a complex task for the interface and the crew)

The crew always should be helped to deal with the issues.

Based in what we learned (not so much) on AF447 we may say the crew barely understood what was happening. And only realized (partially) in the final moments of their plunge.

This is a very important fact. We may say the System failed, at least in three important points:

1) In order to deal with, and present fast and precise information on the SIMPLE (and BRIEF) failure of an important "input" (AS data) to the STABILITY of the plane System. AS probes with a previous history of problems. (Simultaneous "failures")

2) In order to present CLEARLY and with all necessary methods, the REAL EMERGENCY: Plane plunging near TERMINAL SPEED. With ETA to sea level in just 4 minutes.

3) In order to provide "automated" resources to allow the crew fly the plane.

Actually the crew never learned the trigger factor and the short duration of the sensors failure.

And they never elected the top priority, very probable due current deficiencies in the human machine interface.

The silent move of THS made things worse instead to help the crew with useful output to facilitate the urgent need to "make the plane fly again".

The probable "pilot error" in the end, IMO could be applicable during sections of 350 to 380 climb. To PF (absurdly) not trained for hand flying at cruise level.

During the descent, the many facts we learned, suggests important deficiencies in an essential sub System, the man-machine interface.

Thus compromising the ability and the performance of the entire crew. IMO, the human machine interface must be improved urgently and a complex R&D is required for.

Antoine de Saint Exupéry's "It seems that perfection is reached not when there is nothing left to add, but when there is nothing left to take away".
K.I.S.S. principle

Mac

PS

Complex CRM issues (involving plane System) inducing entire crew to important errors. Plane System being imho, the most relevant factor, from apogee to sea level.
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