The pedantic Answer to this Question (dispersal sites after 1968) is that after 30/6/69 there were none. Individual aircraft, maybe a Flight, did TDY.
The purpose of dispersal was to give PM the option not to First Strike (precisely: First Launch, capable of recall) as the Threat worsened, but to Second Strike, Launch on Warning. Fylingdales BMEWS was live from 17/9/63; Clear and Thule had been up since 10/61 but of modest comfort to UK. Nonetheless Bomber Command stood QRA, 1 aircraft per squadron, 24/7, from 1/4/62. Previous dispersal Exercises worked to a presumed 15 mins. Warning, detection of aircraft Threat. Soviet IRBMs precipitated <4 minute Q.
Operational Readiness Platforms to generate 2 or 4 aircraft 2-3 minutes' Q from 9 Main Bases and 27 dispersals were built to Fylingdales' schedule, initiated by 2/62, done largely in 1963 (Wynn.P.306; P.339 has Waddo's completed 2/63. Posters here doubt some planned ORPs - Bruntingthorpe, Elvington, Prestwick, Stansted). PPRuNers noted (most of) these 27 sites and others, but did not separate Away Day Detached Duty from Q/ORP sites. There was no large scale, armed dispersal before 1/4/62 because:
- aircraft did not sit away from Main Base with live British weapons prior to Yellow Sun Mk.2 (see Brian Burnell's site: learn of chicken feathers and ball bearings); and:
- US weapons remained under US custody. So neither RAFG/Canberra B(I)6/8, standing Q 15/9/60-6/6/72, nor TBF Valiant, Q 10/10/60-26/1/65, could disperse.
Hennessy/Secret State,P.201 has PM valiantly holding Alert 3, on Main Bases, not moving to dispersal...but he did not have the option to disperse because: Marham Valiant/Mk.28 were for Saceur, not him, to Task; his 16 Victor 1/Yellow Sun Mk.1 could not disperse; and for his 16 Victor 1/, 24 Vulcan 1/ and 8 Vulcan 2/YS Mk.2 on 3 Main Bases, there was nowhere to go fit to Launch on Warning. If he were to Launch on Command, use them or lose them, he would give Bomber Command the time needed to do so from Main Base.
Q+dispersal applied thus (derived from Wynn):
Honington Victor 1: 1/5/62-6/11/65, and Cottesmore Victor 1: early-63 - 9/64 (though whether 16 Sapphires could be up and at 'em in 4 mins. is unclear);
Coningsby Vulcan 2: early-63 - 11/64 (Wynn lauds the later responsiveness of Olympus 301, so whether 16 Olympus 201...&tc); Wing to:
Cottesmore Vulcan 2: 11/64-2/69;
Waddington Vulcan 1: 1/4/62- mid-67 (though whether 16 Olympus 101...&tc); Wing to:
Waddington Vulcan 2: 9/66- 30/6/69 (Strike Command Q stand down);
Scampton Vulcan 2/Blue Steel: (inert, from 28/3/63; wet: ) 7/64-30/6/69;
Wittering Victor 2/Blue Steel: (inert, from 24/10/63; 1963; wet: ) 7/64-31/12/68. PPRuNer PN has this combo's readiness as "lame".
Waddington Wing operated Vulcan 2/WE177B 9/66-21/12/82, Scampton Wing, 1/1/70-28/2/82. PPRruNers have Waddington's dispersals as BAC Filton, Leuchars, Machrihanish, Manston, Wattisham; Scampton's as RAE Bedford, RNAS Brawdy and Lossiemouth, Kinloss, Leeming. What they did not do after 30/6/69 was disperse on Q.