I agree with Milo, here. I’m sure that a lot of the problems stem from organizational issues within modern corporations, nowhere more so than in the aerospace industry. When building the F-4 and, later, the F-15, McDonnell Douglas orientated itself so that the programmes were focussed on the testing process and on doing that as early as possible in the programme so that problems could be identified and fixed and designs could be optimized. However, companies are now dominated by planners, managers, financiers and legal folk, to the detriment of design optimization and programme success.
On the other side of the fence, military procurement is continually hampered by political and financial uncertainty and departments are often run by people with insufficient specialist knowledge of programme management or the processes involved. Moreover, programme managers are temporary, as I have mentioned before, resulting in a lack of continuity and continual bleeding of corporate knowledge. Btw, I do understand the career implications here.
All of these issues are bad enough in companies that have produced a rapid succession of aircraft and associated systems and a procurement system that is stable and well-resourced (and not continually reorganized). In an era where the complexities of programmes mean very long programmes and the production of fewer types using complex, cutting edge technology (or beyond) with a somewhat shambolic, highly politicised procurement system, the problems are compounded enormously. Add to that uncertainties about requirements, capabilities and outcomes, wavering customer confidence and the continual threat of further defence cuts in virtually all nations’ forces and the programme’s future looks even less certain. This further decreases customer confidence and we have an endless (positive feedback) loop.
So that’s my view of the organisational issues that are hurting this programme (and others). I personally believe it was also a mistake to try to build three significantly different models in essentially the same airframe. This unnecessarily imposed space and weight limitations, which were always bound to lead to less than optimal design – the position of the main gear and hook issue may be an example of this.
So, I am not at all surprised at the current difficulties with F-35. I echo Glojo’s sentiments and hope dearly that it succeeds. There are people in the programme that can make this happen, but they need the support to do their jobs without the politics, processes and organizational madness standing in their way.
I wonder if I fully thought all of that through?
