Received. Read. Excellent.
Many will find the penultimate chapter disturbing, but not in the least bit surprising. (“The RAF Police Investigation”). It raises very pointed questions. Not least, collusion to (my words) obstruct the course of justice . Also, the very selective approach to assessing evidence and the usual MoD stance that only people in the Nimrod IPT could possibly know about systemic (pan-MoD) failings. This compartmentalisation has been a feature of numerous inquiries, including Hercules and Chinook. The RAF police did NOT make any attempt to pursue key evidence from outwith the IPT. And Haddon-Cave ignored official MoD reports that proved him wrong on many counts. Inconvenient, presumably. Let us hope the person advising him is not part of the MAA, because then there is no hope at all.
The decision by both MoD and Civilian authorities (collusion again) that no further action was to be taken against any of the individuals or organisations named by Haddon-Cave (and those who approved the actions of the junior MoD staff but were not named) again raises the question of what proof Haddon-Cave had that made him name these people. As a senior QC he’d be quite conversant with the burden of proof required. It would indeed be interesting if someone named by him sought damages for defamation of character. (In my opinion, the person who was most unfairly blamed, because Haddon-Cave was given irrefutable evidence to the contrary, was General Sam Cowan). But, as in Chinook and other cases, MoD rely on private individuals not having the financial resources to fight back.
Highly recommended. Everyone in MoD should buy a copy. (Because no-one in MoD is going to teach you how to avoid this in future).