PUG,
Thank you for a courteous and constructive reply. I absolutely agree that 'lancing the boil' is the right way forward. (and by the way, I think you are being very honest here.)
Yes, I absolutely agree that the plan for filling aircrew posts in the new 'non-SHAR' JFH was agreed and signed off. I saw the papers myself, as I was involved in the early efforts to do the same for the engineering side. However, there were issues with the plans.
JFH had made no real progress in moving to a 'Joint' way of working. RN aircraft were operated under basically RN rules, RAF aircraft under RAF rules. 3Gp GASOs (an entirely foreign beast that the FAA had never required) had been built so as to preserve these two distinct rules. Even the JAPs had failed to do much more than merely list out the RN/Army/RAF ways of doing 'aviation'. Plugging two sets of people together on RAF owned units without that progress in place generated some major issues.
One early problem was that RAF squadrons had many more aircrew per aircraft than RN. (Not worse, but different). They also had more people at higher ranks in squadrons (Wg Cdrs in command drove that structure), although the RN had started moving that way. The JFH team agreed to 'move the RN towards' an RAF style manning structure, but to be honest they did not have the time to flesh out exactly how that was going to happen. It was a case of 'we're going to get to here and we'll work out the details along the way, with a bit of give and take'. Very much the JFH ethos.
Sadly, that ethos did not survive the abolition of 3Gp and the integration of JFH into 1 Group HQ. At that point, things started going downhill rapidly.
I stand by my view that the RAF hierarchy took a deliberate and orchestrated decision to stop 801 forming by sudden imposition of RAF rules for senior aircrew manning levels. I have solid evidence for that. I won't 'supply' it on this forum in public. Happy to PM if you want to but probably not the point now.
You are right that the RN could not meet their share of the force. The reason was that the 'share' was suddenly and arbitrarily changed to a figure that the RN could not meet for some months. The cancellation of 801 forming then followed at the rush, as we navy types say. (The fact that senior 801 squadron RN personnel had already been appointed and were in the process of moving up to Cottesmore to set up the unit shows how sudden this move was).
I'm really sorry that you seem to infer that the problem was with the RN meeting RAF standards. As you know, I make it a point never to belittle the RAF's professionalism, in fact I go out of my way to recognise it.
Where we should try to agree (if I might suggest) is that JFH was a sad affair that reflected badly on all concerned. It takes two to make an argument, and I believe that JFH was set up to fail by a lack of genuine commitment from all parties to go for a truly 'Joint' unit with new and better ways of doing things.
Going forward (and that's got to be the focus now), I feel that everyone needs to realise that when a new and different way of doing aviation is being considered, any organisation needs to react, adapt and change to meet that challenge. But first it has to recognise it. My concern is that the RAF is interested in, understands and professionally executes land based air power. However, it has no reason, desire or inclination to do the same for maritime aviation, as it really does not recognise that it's any different to a land base. I say again that this does not make the RAF bad, evil or of a lower standard than the FAA or the AAC. It just makes them poorly equipped to meet the challenge that (like it or not) our leaders have set the Armed Forces - to generate an effective and sustainable maritime strike capability.
Best Regards as ever to those still out there doing the job - whatever views we exchange on these forums, let's all try to maintain our unflinching support for them.
Best Regards as ever
Engines