Engines, we need to lance this boil once and for all, because the bitterness to which you refer is being fed by lies by certain individuals who actually shoulder the blame for non-delivery and the lack of a coherent counter argument:
“That plan was on track, and 800 established, when the decision was taken to delete 3 Group and the dark blue AOC post. Once 1 Group had the reins, a unilateral RAF (not joint) review of JFH squadron manning added a number of senior aircrew posts to the squadrons that the RN wasn't in a position to fill straight away. This situation was used, openly and at short notice by senior RAF officers, to delay and then cancel the formation of the second RN heavy front liner. Once that had gone, the rationale for more RN aircrew was, obviously, weakened.”
The plan for the RN to fill half the OCU and the lion’s share of 800 and 801 was agreed, accepted and supported. There is documentary evidence with Joint signatures and I challenge you to give evidence where this was not the case.
The RAF bent over backwards to allow RN aircrew through the system at a faster proportional rate than RAF aircrew. This was necessary because the RN had the added challenge of only being able to recruit against a demanding single seat role – failure rates were higher as a result. The RN even had to recruit ex-RAF aircrew who had failed to gain a single seat recommendation for Typhoon, thus seeing an opportunity to go single seat through the FAA.
The RAF (and RN endorsed) requirement for the correct number of senior supervisors and instructors (flying and weapons) on each Squadron made that challenge even harder. The RAF had accepted the slower RN growth path and was backfilling to facilitate. If it had wanted to kill the FAA FW it could have done it there and then. When JFH took its first reduction under PR10 (and a 2 squadron front-line (effectively ending any hope of 801 growing)), the RAF took a disproportional hit on the reductions; to my knowledge not a single RN pilot was removed from the cockpit when the first reduction happened. In other words, 801 existed in name only.
The key to this argument is two-fold:
The RAF did not stop FAA aircrew meeting their share of the Force – they couldn’t meet it.
What does this mean for an even smaller force in the future – can the RN sustain such a small cadre without RAF support?
By all means supply some evidence that the RAF restricted FAA FW growth. It may have set high standards but the FAA was at liberty to meet them.