The problem faced by all parties here is that MoD’s letters of airworthiness delegation require the holder to immediately (a) take corrective action, if within their remit, and (b) inform their management chain.
While it may be difficult to prove Baber and Eagles did not do so, it can DEFINITELY be proven that the RAF Chief Engineer from 1991-96 (for example) took no action when informed via the various ART reports (including Nimrod), which in turn merely repeated previous warnings to his predecessors. Or, to be more accurate, he did take action – he oversaw the chopping of airworthiness funding for a 2nd and 3rd consecutive year, to the tune of approx 28% p.a.
In fact, Baber could argue he did take action. He was meant to inherit a contract which had the Safety Case under continuous review. He did not, and had to let such a contract himself. (The incompetent management of the contract is a different issue. Incompetence is not an offence, although it offends). By doing so, demonstrably he went further toward meeting his obligation than most others, given the order had been issued under the CE in 1992 to run down these contracts.
Haddon-Cave conveniently ignored these facts (which were also submitted to Ministers in 2005), instead actually praising the two of the more senior officers concerned. Motive?
Had Baber been prosecuted, he would be an utter fool not to have the likes of Alcock subpoenaed – an act which would quickly raise the question precisely how many people in MoD actually met their obligations set out in letters of delegation. It would be quicker to list those who did comply – IFS, EAC and one MoD(PE) project manager (according to MoD themselves). In turn, this would raise the question – If MoD has so few who think it necessary to meet a legal obligation, or competent enough to recognise the failings, then what on earth makes anyone think the MAA is fit for purpose?
As you say, a whitewash. That is why books such as this are necessary.