PUG,
Ok, aircrew.
The RN had two front liners, running at about 7 jets each (equivalent to 8/9 RAF, as jets at second line were not counted) and a second line squadron 9'OCU') with about 9 jets. These units were manned and declared operational. So, the problem?
The RN's SHAR training pipeline had been underperforming for some time, and needed to be fixed. Some of the best 'joint' interaction I saw at JFH was the way that, at the initiative of highly professional and well respected RAF officers, RAF principles and knowledge of aircrew training were being applied to and exploited by the SHAR force to improve matters. Within the first year, pilot output was more than doubled, and the RN had the RAF to thank for that. But that was what JFH was supposed to be about - using best practice to get the best results.
However, once the decision to remove SHAR was taken, a bunfight started over how the RN and RAF aircrew that had once supported five front liners and two OCUs were going to be rebrigaded into four front liners and one OCU. Deletion of the SHAR wasn't helping with RN retention, but a plan was put together (and very much a joint plan) for the new JFH squadron manning, as I've said before, two front liners RN heavy. two front liners RAF heavy, OCU shared.
That plan was on track, and 800 established, when the decision was taken to delete 3 Group and the dark blue AOC post. Once 1 Group had the reins, a unilateral RAF (not joint) review of JFH squadron manning added a number of senior aircrew posts to the squadrons that the RN wasn't in a position to fill straight away. This situation was used, openly and at short notice by senior RAF officers, to delay and then cancel the formation of the second RN heavy front liner. Once that had gone, the rationale for more RN aircrew was, obviously, weakened.
In my view, (and I'm happy if you don't share it) this was the final nail in the coffin for JFH, as trust broke down pretty completely.
Here's my point. The RAF and the RN are two professional services. They were and are both capable of delivering properly manned units to deliver operational capability. They may not do it in the same way, but if there is mutual respect, understanding and flexibility, then they can work together to very good effect. Sadly, that did not happen in JFH, not at the coal face, but at the upper levels (one star and up). And as JFH was owned by the RAF, the RAF bear the responsibility for letting that happen. Blaming the RN aircrew community is not, in my view, right.
I have always, and continue to, make it clear that I have deep respect for the professionalism and expertise of the very many RAF aircrew and engineers I have worked with. The fact that they are not, as a service, really interested in the aviation I spent my working life delivering does not make them bad people in the least. But they shouldn't be entrusted with the future of naval strike aviation.
Best Regards as ever to all those still out there doing the business,
Engines