SP has been really astute in removing the specific details of the flight and permitting the post to remain for discussion. Perhaps we can reward him for that, avoid the rhetoric, and provide a constructive discussion.
It does not surprise me that the main issues that are being discussed here are the ethics of the passenger in initiating this thread, and the actions of the pilot having encountered IIMC; the basis of a 'blame culture' which might result in these incidents being swept under the carpet (as has been recommended).
In one sense this is similar to a parallel and constructive discussion that is going on in the HEMS threads - trying to bring to the fore, and address, the serious problems of 'loss of control' (LOC) and 'CFIT'.
Perhaps the first thing we ought to do is to acknowledge the two elements that were in favour of a safe outcome: (1) the skill of the pilot in executing a reversal of track manoeuvre; and (2) a sizeable helping of luck.
Even though not resulting in an accident, the precursors to this incident would have been similar! These precursors would also be the same for a LOC or CFIT that occurred in any other segment of the industry. One mitigating factor in this case would have been the absence of obstacles that is a feature of offshore operations (but with a concomitant reduction of visual cues).
Perhaps we can move the debate on, examine these 'threats' and consider how to 'control' them. An examination of VFR operations will surface the following:
For a potential LOC (for offshore coupled with CFIT) incident/accident - one threat will be:
attitude cannot be maintained by reference to visual cues
The first control might be:
Dispatch only to approved weather limits
In that case 'threat escalations' could be:
Operating base does not provide an adequate planning system
Pilots do not meet minimum standards for offshore flying
There is pressure to launch below limits
Pilot self-approves flights below limits
Dispatch limits are not well understood
Dispatch limits are not enforced
Following a 'dispatch to approved weather' limits, if adverse weather is encountered, the following threats might be encountered:
En-route weather nears in-flight limits
En-route weather deteriorates below in-flight limits
With the following 'threat escalations':
The pilot does not understand the importance of visual cues
The pilot does not recognise the systems of degradation of visual cues
The pilot cannot estimate visibility in flight
The pilot does not understand the importance of minimum en-route altitude discipline
Having encountered weather below limits a threat control might be:
Crew elect to convert to IFR
With the 'threat esclations':
The pilot has not planned for an IFR recovery
The aircraft is not certificated for flight in IMC
The crew is not qualified, or have recency for flight in IMC
Although, the continuation of the process will result in at least one 'escalation control' for each 'escalation', that is left for the time being. Needless to say, these controls are contained within the broad areas of 'Operational Control', 'Dispatch Control', Safety Oversight', 'crew selection', 'crew training', 'crew discipline' all of which fall within the scope of SMS and culture.
One thing that needs to be emphasized is that encountering adverse weather en-route should be anticipated. This anticipation will consist of a process of monitoring the conditions and having an 'abort plan' (sometimes called an Operational Decision Point (ODP)) which can be brought into operation if the weather nears and then reduces below in-flight limits.
In the main, only the LOC hazard has been addressed here because for offshore flying LOC/CFIT correlate quite closely. For HEMS and onshore operations, CFIT will have its own specific threats, escalations and controls.
Jim