While the government has substantially improved funding for CASA and the ‘independent’ safety investigator, the ATSB, it is reasonable to argue that both have been short changed, and need more in order to bring the reality of safety in Australian skies up to the same heights as the public perception.
The technical work of the ATSB is outstanding, but also very late. And at times, lacking in consistency.
There has been a rise in air traffic control incidents which ought not be excused by the rapid expansion of air travel, given that by any crash statistic flight in anything larger than a small piston engined commuter aircraft has improved to unprecedented levels of low risk.
In the past 12 months the ATSB has identified quite serious lapses in training and professional standards in AirServices Australia, yet, to date, the response from the Minister’s department concerning the need for an independent inquiry into its performance has been that it is perfectly appropriate for it to inquire into itself. It isn’t.
This is an extract from a report on this
late last year.
On 8 October AirServices Australia cleared a private corporate jet, a Gulfstream IV, to descend through the same flight level that a Virgin Australia 737-800 was cruising at on a crossing path as it took around 180 passengers from Brisbane to Sydney.
The private jet was on its way to the Gold Coast, and the incident occurred in the air space near Armidale.
The ATSB recently published what is a truly
damning report concerning a close encounter between a Qantas Cityflyer 767 (250 seats) and a Tiger Airways A320 (180 seats) above Tamworth on 1 July last year.
The incident was every bit as serious as two other instances of gross incompetence by AirServices Australia involving a
near miss between an Emirates 777 and a Qantas 737-800 on 3 September 2009 and
another involving a Cathay Pacific A330 and a Virgin Blue 737-800 near Darwin on 22 December 2009.
The common element in these reports is that the ATSB found that AirServices Australia had allowed inadequately trained officers to manage the separation of jets carrying hundreds of passengers.
When
Plane Talking queried the situation with the office of the Minister for Transport, Anthony Albanese, it was told on the record that it was perfectly appropriate for AirServices Australia to undertake its own reviews of the issues, that public safety wasn’t compromised and, to revert to the short form of words, this writer should get lost.
These serial failures by AirServices Australia raise issues of criminal liability concerning public safety, they require urgent and diligent independent review, they require an action plan to replace a derelict administration of training and safety in AirServices Australia, and above all, they require corrective action before the Minister has to deal with heavy loss of life and an unavoidable Royal Commission.
Whether through approved statements by their chief pilots, or directly from management, all of the major carriers in Australia have expressed dissatisfaction, and even fear, of the risks of a collision in Australian air space, including situations where separation is the responsibility of military controllers where the airlines share an airfield, such as at the Newcastle and Darwin airports and air force bases.
Firing the head of a training college is not the solution to the problem, as happened recently, although it is perhaps a start.
Another operational risk to Australia’s reputation is Jetstar’s apparent serial inability to put competent first officers into its jets, and the ATSB’s reluctance to consistently inquire into major failures of what is known as cockpit resource management or CRM.
The ATSB inquired into an
incident in July last year in which an experienced captain was actually found by Jetstar’s own internal inquiry to have struggled to deal with incompetency on the part of a first officer who seemed to believe in mental telepathy as to who was doing what during an aborted low level approach to Melbourne Airport.
However the ATSB decided
not to inquire into a second incident in November last year in which Jetstar employed a first officer so incompetent that the incorrect wing flap setting was twice selected on an approach to Cairns.
If that sort of safety risk is manifested in the cockpit of an Australian airliner the ATSB ought to inquire. Not to inquire adds to the reputational damage recent events have caused to the conduct of aviation administration in this country.
Coming back to the press release that has encouraged this article, I’ve tested positive on about one occasion a year to an explosives trace at an Australian airport for the last two to three years. I live on a farm, so this isn’t surprising, given possible skin and clothing exposure to traces of fertilisers. However on each occasion I was asked if I lived or worked on a farm or near chemicals, and re-tested with the wand held backwards so that the problem would go away, making it obvious to me that this is all part of the theatre of airport security, and that if all those who tested positive were detained and thoroughly checked out, the airports would grind to a halt.