The top level document is the ICAO Manual of Accident and Incident Investigation Doc 9756-AN/965
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ICAO DOC 9756 Part 2 and 3 [Archive] - PPRuNe Forums
As suggested in #2, a good grounding in HF is required, ideally over and above that given in the usual CRM / HF courses.
I don’t favor HFACS or similar systems as there is a risk that once the incident is placed in the appropriate box then the matter is closed; deeper analysis should always be undertaken.
The best tool is your mind – your ability to think about the incident in context and based on experience, yours and others; but of course remaining impartial and avoiding hindsight. I judge avoiding hindsight the most important and the most difficult aspect of any investigation.
Information gathering will probably focus on the people involved (the crew). They will remember much more than they think they have done, although their time-line can be incorrect and distorted; thus the task is to extract the relevant memories.
If you have FDR or similar records, first study them and construct a generalized view. Then interview each crew member individually without use or sight of this data. Update your model of events as the process progresses. If possible interviews should be in private and away from work connotations. I had some successes on coffee shops.
Many operators / people wish to include unions etc. IMHO these are more of a hindrance than a help; any external involvement must be strictly as an observer. If a crew does not have confidence in an operator’s safety system and impartiality, then you have your first finding of the investigation.
Any other inputs such as specialist technical questions, should be put to the interviewer away from the interview.
Repeat the process with all crew present, first without, and then with data.
Look at the crew’s body language. Arms and legs can indicate control actions. Arms, hands, finger positions and looks can indicate instrument indications and switching activities. Listen to the content and intonation of what is said; note the confidence of statements given.
Avoid leading questions, let the crew ‘construct’ their view of events from memory, don’t update or comment on this, but use it as a basis for future enhancing questions. The crew will have different memories and perceptions of events; don’t side with one or the other as both are valid. The investigators task is to ‘keep the peace’, explaining that everyone will see and remember things differently, and that their view, their opinion is ‘correct’; the objective is to learn and correct ‘the system’, not to allocate blame. Avoid the use of the term ‘error’ – try performance variability (search for Hollnagel).
The opinions – individual’s perception of events, can unlock aspects of understanding, training, experience, and organizational inputs – SOPs, safety culture.
For info:
Becky Milne explains the cognitive interview - OpenLearn - Open University
http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~cmh7p/iet2006-reading.pdf
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/228.pdf
http://brainimaging.waisman.wisc.edu...nts%202002.pdf
A Layman's Introduction to Human Factors in Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
http://www.it.uu.se/research/project...evention%20%22