Originally Posted by
MurphyWasRight
A much simpler and reliable solution is to latch the stall warning once a (fully developed?) stall is detected then do not clear the condition until sensors show the aircraft to be flying (unstalled) again.
While clearly not the "cause" of this accident the stall warning re-appearing when the correct (ND) input was applied could not have helped.
Define "sensors show the aircraft to be flying (unstalled) again" in the case where those sensor values are out of valid range. That is where the complex software comes back in with all the associated problems / risks.
Then consider dealing with a latched warning which is spurious (for reasons of sensor failure or whatever) and is going to block out other lower-level warnings you may actually need to deal with the real problem.
Think maybe the latched warning is going to need a cb / off switch ?
This crew ignored stall warning for some time. Thinking it was spurious ?
Think the 447 crew would have pulled that cb / switch ?