Old 13th Jan 2012, 00:39
  #113 (permalink)  
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: somewhere
Posts: 451
Stall warning logic.

With the first problem being unreliable airspeed, it may have caused them to subconsciously dismiss the warning.
Further another Airbus "feature" may have enforced their belief that they in fact where not in a stall.
As they pulled back and the speed dropped below 60 kts the stall warning seized.
Question: How can you design a stall warning that stops when the airspeed get extremely critical?
How can the "logic" dismiss a speed of less that 60 kts as being "invalid" when the air/ground sensor is in flight?
this was not the - Airbus Stall Warning Logic - it was the ADIRUs which invalidated the AOAs.....

Boeing drivers, be prepared,


The AOA will be invalidated if the CAS <30 kts = NIL stick shaker......
Don't rely on your SAARU because it already did quit at CAS <50kts
and Yes this is true when the air/ground sensor is in flight!
A33Zab is offline