We have discussed at length the issue of encountering a reduction of visual cues in the en-route phases (associated with lighting levels, weather or just a sparsely populated area with low levels of cultural lighting). Although mentioned several times, we have not spent a great deal of time on Operational Control.
Contrary to the implication of Aerobot's post, operational control is not just about aborting a flight in the en-route phase - which quite correctly lies
completely within the ambit of the pilot. It has more to do with section C. of Appendix 1 Order 8400.10, Volume 3, Chapter 6 Section 5 which includes: the delivery and maintenance of a serviceable helicopter; locating the aircraft when a flight plan is not filed; the conduct of operations in accordance with the OpSpecs; the qualification and allocation of crews to flights; and, most importantly, the system and control of dispatch (all contained within Notice N 8000.347.)
As I indicated before, this was one of the subjects discussed with the Rapporteur of the ICAO HEMS WG in our exchanged of emails - an excerpt of which is shown below:
Although the policy of choosing, and following, the en-route policy is an important issue, in my mind the real issue is the escape strategy once it becomes doubtful (it is rarely clear) that the flight cannot proceed at the assigned level (or with the encountered in-flight visibility). In a number of cases (with IFR twins as well as VFR singles) it is the gradual and insidious degradation of visual cues that results in loss of control. Early recognition of the onset of such conditions is the key to avoiding the consequences of a loss of control in a degraded visual environment.
It is only when company culture (management and pilot attitudes) accept that early and decisive action can avoid the (probably not inevitable – making this a difficult call) consequence without recrimination (from management or from other pilots) and effect on personal reputation and ego, will the required change on attitudes be achieved (sorry about the complex sentence). This is much easier to achieve in a two-crew environment (two pilots, or one pilot and a trained HEMS crew member).
It is not difficult to conclude that two of the most important elements with respect to HEMS safety are the company culture (substantially affected by the business model) and operational control (once again substantially affected by the business model). Whilst the business model may not be something that can be influenced by a committee such as yours (or even by ICAO), culture and operational control most certainly are.
I have forwarded you the FAA guidance on operational control because it does (in my view) have relevance to the dispatch and continuation of any HEMS mission. Note, particularly, the operators responsibility with respect to the dispatch of any HEMS flight – regardless of the remoteness of the operation.
Jim