Hi Mick, I'm afraid I've stopped reading the Times since "pay to read" came in (which is a shame) so I just had to go by the text above.
I have now received documentation showing that this is not the case.
Quote:
Reversionary Control Mode. Failures (hard faults) during reversionary control system operation are indicated by failure of the FADEC system to respond to ENG RPM TRIM (collective grip) control. Once failed, the reversionary system faults to fixed fuel flow. The reversionary system faults to fixed fuel flow. The reversionary control system fixed fuel setting does not allow for any proportional control using the ECL. The ECL only allows the engine to be set from a fixed fuel setting to an engine off setting. Changes in power settings on the effected engine are not compensated for directly by the FADEC system and may allow engine overspeeding up to the overspeed limiter control set speed. It is advisable to minimize power changes during this condition. In addition, the effected engine should be shutdown prior to descending for landing.
Primary and Reversionary Mode. If the primary control system fails and the reversionary system has already failed, the FADEC reverts to a fixed fuel flow setting. Changes in engine power settings will not be controllable on the effected engine. The engine should be secured prior to descending for landing.
This implies that whilst the control becomes very limited if a FADEC fails, and the affected engine should be shut down for landing, it is not in itself necessarily a catastrophic hazard. This is a very important consideration on this particular outrage bus. Furthermore a chinook can still fly on one engine, though of course in some conditions/weights a rather quick landing maybe required.
The probability of both connectors simultaneously coming out of both FADECs will also be very low, which will also be a factor to be considered in the overall risk being taken.
PS do droop stops still fall out or is that now fixed or just prevented by "inspection"?