Guys,
Coming in quite carefully here, but as a previous EA for fixed and rotary and also an RTSA, I just cannot imagine what anyone was doing signing off an SI to check security of a flight safety critical DECU connector in flight. I had heard about this, but this is the first time I've seen it 'in clear'.
The procedure cannot have mitigated the risk unless they had some strong evidence on how long it took connectors to come loose and under what flight conditions.
Not good design? Quite awful design, full stop. Unfit for purpose, full stop.
In my professional view, this should have been a grounding until the connectors were made safe - I find it hard to imagine that a reasonable temporary solution could not have been devised fairly rapidly (locking wire?) pending a DA solution. But, as ever, I'm happy to be told I'm wrong.
Again, in my honest view, in engineering as in flying, there is always a danger of 'pressing on' when the right thing to do is 'stop'. The whole saga being laid out here is a great example of what looks horribly like a 'press on' culture.
Best Regards as ever to the people actually flying (and maintaining) in harm's way,
Engines