I don't follow why you think a simple statement of fact about how a metal case can help protect against RFI/EMC issues is unusual? If anything I find the statement entirely benign.
I would be more surprised if anyone reading these notes was not aware already of the routinely employed faraday cage principle.
·The FADEC software implementation was “positively dangerous”.
I have always found this statement bizarre, and frankly it seems a bit unprofessional - I have not yet seen any evidence released to support this statement.
Usually when a dangerous or erroneous error is detected in a piece of critical software then there is information available as to what the error is, what condition it could lead to and what could be done to avoid its repetition. Examples are numerous, interesting and informative - Ariane 5* etc.
This leads me to assume that there was no real basis upon which to state that the software was 'positively dangerous'. If there were features in the code that were dangerous, leading to hazardous events on the ac, I have no doubt that the failure mode would have been widely reported and discussed. It hasn't. It sounds more like here was some dispute as to the level of anaysis that was applied to demonstrate the correctness of the coding - a notoriously controversial area between those that regulate and those who actually develop systems - which IMO is no basis to make a declaration of it being "positively dangerous". The language is inappropriate for such a report unless there was such clear "Ariane 5" type evidence - which it seems very likely there isn't!
Just my opinion.
(* Ariane 5 was shown to have a coding feature in its INS platform related to its reuse from Ariane 4. To cut a long story short the Ariane 5 'profile of use' was different to those of Ariane 4 which has previously been used to define the software of the INS - and hence it could be shown that the different profile would cause the software to 'fail' every time in Ariane 5 - this was a clearly demonstrable and repeatable error which led to the complete loss of the first Ariane 5).