Which is confusing, but only if AF abnormal procedures for Unreliable Airspeed are not followed (FD 1 and 2 ..... OFF)
The ECAM ADR CHECK PROC drill came only after 02:12:xx and at that time they were already in deep trouble.
When AP disconnected @ 02:10:05 the UAS (iced pitots) must have been lasted
NOT longer dan 10 sec. otherwise this ADR ECAM Message would have been triggered.
(This ADR CHECK ECAM message has higher priority (116) above other present level 2 messages,
so would have been in view)
"If two ADR outputs are erroneous, but different, and the remaining ADR is correct, or if all three are erroneous, but different
The autopilot and the autothrust are disconnected by the FE (whichever autopilot is engaged).
If the disagree lasts for more than 10 seconds, the PRIM triggers the ADR DISAGREE ECAM
caution.
It reverts to Alternate 2 law (without high and low speed protection).
On both PFD, “SPD LIM” flag is shown, no VLS and no VSW is displayed.
This situation is latched, until a PRIM reset is performed on the ground without any hydraulic
pressure.
However, if the anomaly was only transient, the autopilot and the autothrust can be re-engaged when
the disagree has disappeared."