Your reasoning is flawed FGD.
You say this crew should have responded as if an ADIRU failure was a memory item to be actioned immediately lest a false FBW protection be activated with the results that occurred.
An ADIRU failure at the time, was a non-event ECAM checklist. A faulty ADIRU was supposed to be compared to the other two, and if it had suspect data it would be ignored by the flight control system and flight data to the crew would be restored by switching.
In this case, not only was the relevant ECAM not displayed, but the system reacted to the false data in a way never envisioned by the designers.
You seem to think that the crew should have had some sort of immediate cognizance of an unannunciated fault, and should have gone against their training and immediately switched off the ADIRU to avoid an outcome that somehow, they presciently realised may happen? .... something that had never previously occurred in 28 million flight hours?
The QPG fault a few months later was ameliorated by use of the OEB that did not exist for the QPA incident. That crew reacted with full knowledge of what had gone before them and a checklist to cope with it.... something the crew of QPA did not.
Congratulations of the excellent 20/20 hindsight...