After joining the RAAF 27 years ago, I cannot shake the feeling that our pilot manning philosophy hasn’t really changed since WWII and is disconnected from present day reality.
When I joined in the mid eighties Qantas et al were hoovering RAAF pilots, effectively decimating some squadrons. I recall a certain Chief of the Air Staff (as he wanted to be called back then
) going through an uncomfortable experience on 60 Minutes answering questions about RAAF pilot manning.
One
never saw ex-RAAF airline drivers trying to rejoin. The events of the last couple of years have taught me that the days of the massive recruiting drives by the major airlines are dead and gone. One only has to peruse the many threads on the topic right here to conclude that being an airline pilot ain’t what it used to be. Regular perusal of the RAAF’s posting and promotions website reveals a steady trickle of guys sneaking back in. I have seen the grass on the other side of the fence (not airline grass, granted), and will concede that for all its faults and failings the RAAF is a pretty good gig compared to what is currently on offer outside.
The days of pilots flying large formations of aircraft into battle (think the 1,000 bomber formations of WWII, and Operation Linebacker in Vietnam) are long gone and will never re-appear. Today we see smaller numbers of far technically superior and capable aircraft operating in a vastly more complex environment.
This is where I think the RAAF starts to go wrong with respect to pilot manning. Given the cost (both monetary and time) of training a pilot to the front line, I consider it essential that as much as possible is done to retain that training and experience where it will be of most benefit – on the front line. In 27 years I have witnessed the reduction of overall flying rates. Given the expense of acquiring and operating today’s aircraft that is somewhat understandable. However now we have more complex aircraft being operated in a more complex environment by aircrew with less hours in their logbooks.
Now I will concede that I have not read the RAAF’s Air Power Manual (gee, there goes my shot at the top job!), but I reckon my definition of “air power” will ring true with most others. That is; air power is the delivery of bombs on target on time, the defeat of enemy aircraft, the delivery of a bunch of grunts on target on time, the detection and destruction of enemy submarines. That’s it. That’s what we do – or should be doing!
So doesn’t it make sense to ensure that our expensive aircraft are operated by the best trained and the most experienced aircrew possible? Don’t we owe it to the Australian taxpayer to ensure our aircraft are operated by the most experienced aircrew possible?
Well from what I can see, those in the Ivory Tower have a vastly different definition of air power. They seem to think that air power is best served by more senior officers with less experience. “Au contraire”, I hear you say? Well have a look at the RAAF’s website on the DRN. In particular have a look at the “Know Your Leaders’” section and count the number of one-star and above appointments then count the number of flying squadrons. Long story short – we are grossly top heavy.
The paradigms have changed, and we haven’t changed our modus operandi to suit.
As we all know it’s of little use to anyone whinging without proposing a solution. So here goes.
1. Let’s have a look at all appointments above unit command that require aircrew experience and ask ourselves if that appointment is essential to the delivery of air power. If not, axe it. When it is vacated do not post someone in to fill it. Yes that’s right – let’s start turning the “stove pipe” back to a “pyramid”.
2. Go to every flying unit and ask who wants to stay there and not be promoted. I reckon you’ll get 95% putting up their hands. Now given that there are non-flying positions that do require aircrew experience, some turnover from the units will have to happen. But let’s do it with the capability of the front line uppermost in mind, not just to feed the promotion system.
Go back to the units in 12 months and ask the same question, and I reckon you’ll find a few who will opt to move up.
Now I will concede the RAAF has recognised the importance of retaining experience, but a half-assed specialist aircrew scheme and the (ab)use of reserves hasn’t really helped.
3. Now the net effect of the first two points on the training system can only be beneficial. Less pilots required means less demand and stress on the pilot training system. Less training equals less expense.
Now I’m sure I’ll be shot down in flames by someone espousing the “party line”. But ask yourselves why they defend it. Are they thinking about the application of air power in mind, or their own promotion prospects? The “party line” doesn’t work, amigos.
A rewarding, safe and enjoyable 2012 to all.
The above may or may not have been influenced by a bottle of Victorian shiraz.