Good points, Stallie. This report falls short of the "objective" standard stated by the ATSB's own website. As we have seen, in places throughout the report where just plain facts should be the order of the day, we have in many instances, opinions - opinions that are slapping the crew on the back.
Every single one of those opinions that I quoted earlier could have been left out of the report entirely.
This deviation from the ATSB's own "objective" standard could be put down to the author's lack of report writing experience. (It is my assumption that he lacks experience in this regard. Other aspects of the report would suggest this).
Or, the deviation could be for the reasons I have given earlier. I'm no conspiracy theorist, but it does just sound so much like he is trying to shield the pilots.
I have only come this far on this because of those opinionated statements. When the final report became available, I looked at it with the intention of skimming through the executive summary and findings. In the executive summary was this statement:
The flight crew’s responses to the emergency were timely and appropriate.
I was immediately struck by this statement as it stood out like the proverbial. I have never seen such a bald statement in such a key place of an air safety report before. Come to think of it, I have never seen a statement like it anywhere, in any air safety report, ever!
Where the ATSB has 'praised' it is deserved and recognizes that, in the circumstances, this crew acted in the most timely/appropriate/prompt manner possible.
But,
Jetsbest, it is not their place to
praise. If praise is in order (and I believe it is), then this should be done by those that normally do it (e.g., the airline, the unions, the passengers, professional pilot groups, etc).
... when did the ATSB start naming the companies involved?
Another break from convention is the usage of rank to identify the pilots. The norm when reporting actions and observations from the pilots is to refer to them as "PF" and "PNF".
Capt Kremin,
Although the crew received numerous ECAM caution messages, none of them required urgent action,
Not sure what you're getting at here, but the upset certainly required urgent action.
... which computer or computers do you isolate?
By "isolate" I mean
reduce, tothe greatest extent possible, the influence of the computers on the flight controls. From what I understand, this is achieved by manually forcing the computers into "direct law".
... so what Law is the aircraft operating in? Is it any wonder that there was confusion?
There was an ECAM message stating that "alternate law" had been entered. I am suggesting that the best course of action would have been to force "direct law".
Like the ATSB investigator, you seem to be accepting the confusion as normal - and not something that may be a serious safety issue.
Utimately is doesn't matter what Law the aircraft is operating in if you apply the "Golden Rules" of flying an Airbus... that is, if it isn't doing what you expect, take over and fly it manually.
Not a very golden rule in this case. Flying it "manually" did not prevent the upsets. Being in "direct law" would have.
On a Chieftain or a Baron, disengaging the autopilot and "flying it manually" is a sound course of action when the autopilot starts doing funny things on the controls.
But on the Airbus, "flying it manually" means the computers are still just as involved as they are when "on autopilot", so although this would be a sound move for a range of other situations, it is not a smart move when the computers are doing dangerous things with the control surfaces.
... no clue as to the real culprit.
I would dispute this. The captain was getting clues on his PFD as to who the culprit was, but I will go into that more on a future post.
The ATSB don't just interview the crew, decide they're nice blokes, and then shield them from criticism by contriving the evidence.
So how do you explain the lack of interest by the ATSB in the crew's performance subsequent to the pitch-downs? This was a minor malfunction in broad daylight VMC conditions, yet the crew were experiencing "mode confusion" and were somewhat overwhelmed. We also know they had reached a point of "distrust" of the warnings and messages.
Surely you can see that these are serious safety issues. Why can't the ATSB see this?
The ATSB needs to be seen to be objective but it has failed in many keys areas of this report. But this is only my most minor gripe. My big gripe is that there are four major safety issues that the ATSB don't seem to have recognised.
The author/investigator has zeroed in on a minor malfunction in a single component. He has missed all the systemwide safety issues.