In an earlier post, I listed three major safety issues raised by this accident that have all been missed by the ATSB.
Here is the fourth:
4. That there are no procedures/training for when the computers begin making dangerously misguided control surface deflections.
From the report:
There were also no other procedures available for the situation they were experiencing.
For an airliner that is almost 100% computer controlled, I find it
utterly astonishing that Airbus and/or Qantas haven't established procedures or conducted training for when the computers get confused.
I am only a plodding GA driver, but to me, the immediate action would be to isolate, to the greatest degree possible, the computers.
This means, firstly, manually switching to "direct law". Then, switching the computers so that a different "prim" (primary flight control computer) is manipulating the surfaces.