Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers".

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Originally Posted by orca

A serious question. Like, love or otherwise the whole 'keep a few Harriers for skill preservation' idea, why is it always a RNR plan?

One of the major arguments against the plan disappears if it were to be RN. The counter I guess being that the post SDSR RN complement didn't cater for a modest uplift in personnel at Yeovilton.

Good question. Last year's proposal, which was backed (supposedly) by the First Sea Lord (and which could have worked according to Tourist) was RNR based, but surely would have included regular RN - see my comment about very experienced and highly skilled Engineers and Pilots. My suggestion would be to combine RN, RNR, civil service, and contractor personnel. RN providing the full time core (alongside NFSF(FW?) with RNR attached, perhaps? In a the event of a crisis causing a need for more aircraft to be regenerated and the force to be worked up, they would be augmented by other RN and RNR personnel.

The idea (mine) was to maintain something that could be grown over x months in response to a crisis to provide a squadron of aircraft. If nothing else, it would allow the UK to deploy Lusty/QE in rotation with Charles De Gaulle - which we could not do during the Libyan operation, a source of some consternation. Similarly, it would tell interested parties that the UK could mount and deploy a credible task group to the South Atlantic faster than Argentina could put together an invasion fleet. In the interim personnel would retain familiarly with Sea Harrier, and those aircraft could embark aboard Lusty/QE to allow the chockheads, OOW, et al to get experience of working with jets on deck at sea.

I am very tempted to point out that Art Nalls had never flown a Sea Harrier, but found that the USMC AV-8B simulator could be programmed to simulate his Sea Jet. Likewise his volunteer maintainers from AV-8B units had never worked on Shar before, and doubt many were left from the AV-8A days.

Originally Posted by downsizer

World of difference betweem keeping a Hunter in the air and complex aircraft like a Harrier....

Of course. But is there not a privately operated Buccaneer too?

Evalu8tor

So have we defeated ourselves with paperwork? Like you say it would not been too easy, but nor would it be impossible. Out of interest, how do people like RNHF get on? The RNHF Sea Hawk is surely a military aircraft, on the military register, and flown by a military pilot. How do they get on with respect to dealing with the MAA?

With respect to point 4 (V/STOL deck handling being irrelevant) I would suggest that the basics of moving about a live jet on a moving deck is similar regardless of whether the aircraft is flung into the sky with a catapult and arrested with wires on landing, or if it flings itself into the sky and lands from a hover. After all we retain Sea Harriers at Culdrose from training aircraft handlers on the dummy deck at Culdrose.

I sent a PM to a WAFU and asked him why people thought that going from a decade with no fixed wing aircraft at sea to cat/trap operations would be a non issue, or even less of an issue than moving from STOVL operations. He replied that people were not thinking at all, and that without basic skills then moving onto to far more demanding stuff would be much more difficult and involve greater risk.

There is also the issue of crises in between now and the time then CVF and F35C are in service......

When the RMS Titanic slipped her moorings in April 1912 there we no icebergs in Southampton harbour. Nor were there any in New York harbour. She was unsinkable and had no need to worry about icebergs anyway, so they got rid of most of the planned lifeboats. History records that she never made it to New York, having struck an iceberg and most of her passengers and crew perishing due to a lack of lifeboats.

Just because we do not expect a crisis this decade does not mean we will not face one. It seems horribly inevitable that the stand off between Iran and the everyone else over Tehran's nuclear programme will result in something happening - either UN sanctions being stepped up, or a US/Israeli strike. Iran has threatened international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf. It would be dangerous to ignore this threat - including that from aircraft and air launched missiles, or even airborne ISTAR assets. In the South Atlantic, Argentina continues to make belligerent noises. It might be dangerous to dismiss this as simple political hot air, as we did in 1981/1982. In the strange post SDSR world, any news regarding the Falklands is dismissed due to political sensitivities, as it was before the 1982 invasion. We have blinded ourselves.

The fight against Al Qaeda and its affiliates is moving too, to both sides of the Gulf of Aden. In Somalia, Al Shabaab has links with Al Qaeda, and suspected links with some pirate groups. The pirates have shown the vulnerability of commercial shipping to attack. In Yemen, AQAP has not only threatened to destabilise the region, but is also a source of terrorist plots against Western targets, and were responsible for maritime attacks. Whilst a few UK personnel have operated there, I cannot see that any Western power will want to put large numbers of troops ashore on either side of the Gulf of Aden. Finding a nearby friendly airbase may be tricky.

Then there are the unknown unknowns...

Engines

You forgot to add that the three services have to cross fingers and hope that nothing really bad happens.

Maybe we should pay more attention to the comments of Rear Admiral Chris Parry:

Therefore, for practical, presentational and tactical reasons, the RN urgently needs to develop a vision and two operational concepts – one for the period covered by the carrier and naval air 'holiday' and another for when the carrier(s) enter(s) service, with a recognisable migration path linking the two. They particularly need to address the uncertainties and inconsistencies of the carrier programme, as well as outlining a more sophisticated, innovative and agile approach to force generation, procurement and skills development. It would typically need to include operationalised modular and adaptive solutions, the retention of long-lead, but surplus, platforms, smart regeneration programmes and more intelligent use of reserves, especially those who have already acquired advanced skills and experience during previous regular service.