Ampan, My point being that Collins was fooled by sector whiteout, a phenomenon that he had no knowledge or training on. Both pilots obviously believed that they had adequate visual reference by what they saw out of the window and by what ATC told them. They believed, based on what they were briefed upon, that the RNAV track was to drop them over the entrance of McMurdo Sound, clear of mountains.
Current practice by RNZAF, RAAF and the yanks at the time was for commanders to make three entries under supervision. Air NZ had achieved a dispensation from that on the basis that their training (or briefings) were of such a high standard that this was not required.
Sector whiteout was no mystery to regular operators in Antarctica at that time and yet it was not a topic that was included in any of the ANZ briefings. Even their CP (Shredder) showed only rudimentary knowledge of the whiteout illusion during the inquiry. This barely reflects a high standard of training.
There is no argument that the crew didn't play a part in this accident. They did as they most often do. However that is not what Chippendales report portrays. It conveniently heaps nearly all of the blame onto the dead crew. That certainly curbed the litigation against New Zealanders and saved Muldoons career, but it did nothing toward identifying the latent and active failures that were clearly buried well into Air New Zealand's operations management system. In particular the Navigation section.
Mahons report did.