In my earlier post I had pointed out (now emphasized) that the discussion was about engine failures due to unconnected causes – all the cases that have been referenced since were failures due to
connected causes.
As Geoff has pointed out, hostility exists when the rescue time exceeds the survival time under the prevailing conditions. Here is a case in point:
On February 16, 2003, approximately 1225 central standard time, a Bell 407 single-engine helicopter, landed offshore (FAA speak for ditched) in the Gulf of Mexico following a loss of engine power.
The helicopter was owned and operated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135, by Houston Helicopters, Inc., at Pearland, Texas. The pilot and one passenger received fatal injuries, and three passengers received serious injuries. The helicopter has not been recovered and is presumed destroyed.
Note: these injuries were, in fact, the onset of hypothermia due to exposure.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, and a company visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan was filed for the on-demand air taxi flight.
Approximately 1210, the helicopter departed Harbor Island (Tesoro Heliport) at Ingleside, Texas, for the 26.1 nautical mile flight to the Ensco Rig 84 (Matagorda 700 block offshore).
The operator and the dispatcher reported that the pilot transmitted a Mayday call, engine failure, and that he was going to land the helicopter on the water. The Coast Guard at Aransas Pass, Texas, and Corpus Christi, Texas, were notified. Search and rescue was initiated by the operator, Coast Guard, water vessels, and other helicopter operators.
Two of the passengers reported that the helicopter rolled inverted within a few seconds after the landing. The pilot and passengers exited the helicopter, inflated their life vest, and awaited their rescue. Approximately 1425, the pilot and passengers were recovered by the Coast Guard.
The operator, the dispatcher, Coast Guard helicopter pilots, pilots of other search helicopters, and two of the passengers reported the winds were from the north at 25-40 mph with 5 to 9-foot seas (Sea State 5).
Where transient
hostile conditions obtain, the operator (or oil company) has a duty of care to ensure that the Risk is Managed using ‘adverse weather policy’ -
all the precursors were there.
There was a ‘reasonably probable’ expectation (R=1 x 10xx-5 per flight hour) that this engine would fail.
Jim