Machinbird
I have stated earlier that I see merit in your suggestion but that I see it on a mechanistic level - an explanation of how the phenomenon worked but not a casual factor. This is my main objection to the paper you linked. It was too vague and too inclusive. The phenomenon wasn't adequately defined (it could be anything seemed to be the message) and it seemed to want to attribute an overly deterministic approach to a pilots actions. In other words the pilot was not responsible for his actions and a helpless victim of PIO. One is forced into the question why have pilots then? Are they truly unable to take decisions and judge a situation? I tend to believe that a pilot has responsibility for his/her actions and that a statement like 'is not the fault of the pilot' (Conclusion No. 3) is just as dangerous and misleading as 'is the fault of the pilot'.
We end up returning to the human and cultural factors of training, CRM, SOPs, chain of command. You mentioned you experienced PIO in the simulator and how you solved it by using your instruments. This seems to have been lacking from the PF - as I stated before know your machine and trust your instruments. It's a training and cockpit discipline issue and the paper seems to make no mention of this. You yourself mentioned training and I would add practice - skills atrophy without use. Once again one is forced back to the conclusion that this was a poor crew who took a perfectly flyable aircraft and put it into a non flyable state. Whether they were a one off or indicative of a broader trend is open to debate. Of course the crew were poorly served by their employer - Air France; and the Air France safety audit indicates serious cultural issues developing in their pilot corps. One hopes that Air France are addressing these as a matter of urgency.
If BEA do not reference PIO as a factor it won't be because they have an agenda but because they don't consider it germaine. That too is a legitimate judgment.