Lyman
Your Quote:
Generally, the a/p should be disconnected when entering turbulence as well. Better to not let the a/c try to solve something it cannot fix.
Gee, that ought to fix everything when flying at 35K and Mach 0.82
It is getting more bizarre with every post. Here are two quotes that make much sense to me:
1. From
Takata Events Leading To LOC (my words)
Illusion, deceleration, and weather.
- Illusion because altitude recorded is "indicated", then partially false at UAS point.
- Deceleration, because autothrust started to reduce N1 by 16% seven seconds before UAS event.
- Weather because there was an up/down/up.
2. From
SmilinEd Recovery (my word)
All they needed to do was to:
1. Take a deep breath and watch what the aircraft did under the pitch and power that was set before the AP dropped out.
2. Make gentle corrections to ensure that altitude and heading were maintained within some reasonable limits given the turbulence encountered.
They didn't do either.
Further, Why did they get to where they got to when all this happened (A/P disconnect, A/T disconnect, etc.)? Why did they think the ITCZ was somewhere off in the distance and may have been surprised to find themselves in the middle of it? What were the cockpit conversations, P/F P/NF, not just 5 or 10 minutes before A/P disconnect, but 30 minutes before? Who was monitoring the weather radar? Was it being monitored? Was it set properly? IMHO, this is where the setup to disaster began, but not much has been said about this.
TD