Originally Posted by
framer
They asked for, and got, the responsibility to seperate the aircraft from terrain visually.
But as far as they were aware, the only way they would have been given the opportunity to do so would be if the radar controllers had positively identified them.
There wouldn't even be an argument if those in your camp didn't want complete absolution of responsibility for the crew...
If this was an accident that happened 10, even 20 years ago then I'd be four square behind you - but in this case the accident occurred during a time of transition in commercial aviation - where the pace of progress outstripped the regulatory capabilities that could be brought to bear, and the airlines were telling their crews things that contradicted regulations, that contradicting them was OK - and that the combination of airline procedure and computer technology would keep them safe.
...who flew a servicable heavy jet at 1500ft, 250kts, below MSA, in a foreign environment, while navigating visually ... after the met service had told them that the cloud was broken at 2000ft and there were snow showers in the area.
Because they had been told it was safe to do so as there were several redundant layers of safeguards (radar, INS, computerised flight plan). All of which had been compromised on the day, but the crew didn't know that.
Complete absolution is too much. It would be a very dangerous day for airline travel the day that the P in C didn't hold some responsibility for doing that.
In this day and age you'd be right, and it's ironic that the Mahon Report in part provided the wake-up call that all was not well in commercial aviation. But the argument that the crew in this case should be apportioned no responsibility hinges on the fact that the redundant layers of safety promised to them by the company - which gave them the confidence to fly the route in the first place - had all been foiled by a chain of mistakes within the airline before the DC-10 had even left the ground
and nobody told them.