@chris_lz:
I'll try to answer, but I think we're getting several hypotheticals away from relevant...
The answer to your first question depends entirely on how they navigated down there in the first place without INS (and given that the trips relied on INS to some extent to get them in the ballpark because the previous onboard navaids were not accurate enough it makes it extremely hypothetical as a situation). The only way I could see them doing it would be if they had a fully-qualified and dedicated navigator onboard, which would place the onus on the crew in any case. The computerised flight plans were sold as a safety measure as well as a cost-saving measure, but if you don't do it right then it means responsibility for navigation errors travels further up the chain than it did in the past (something that the regulations at the time did not recognise).
As far as your second question goes, I think they'd have turned back as soon as they positively identified an AINS fault.
@henry crun - Doesn't mean it didn't happen that way.
@framer - I phrased it badly (late night, sloppy thinking). I should have said it is *one* of the reasons. One of many others is that the crew had every right to do what they did on the basis of what they had been told by their superiors and nav section. The misidentification was partly down to rotten luck, which you can't do much about - but it was also partly down to very sloppy communication and organisation on the part of ANZ, which something could very much be done about. The pilots made a misidentification visually, but Vette's research proved that this was understandable and in my opinion (along with many others) this negates any idea that they should carry any blame. But there should have been safeguards - two of which were the radar station and the INS track. The failure to effectively communicate the change in planned track to the radar station or the crew lies squarely in ANZ's court. Had they done either or both of those things then in all probability the accident would never have happened.
That said, you may call it emotional - but it's valid in terms of verbal and conceptual reasoning as well. If ANZ had as much faith in the "pilot error" finding based on strict adherence to rules in the way that prospector, ampan and yourself seem to, then why behave in a manner that made it look like they had something to hide? It doesn't make sense.
Remember that Chippindale (and indeed Collins') RNZAF experience was more like 50-60 years ago, when military ops were a very different beast indeed (even airline crews carried full-time navigators back then!).
We've been over this before, but just because the rules state that the pilot is responsible for navigation under VMC rules, it does not automatically follow that the pilot should be blamed for an accident if one or more outside factors for which they are not prepared are the root cause of said misidentification. Hypothetically, if the flight was navigated DR from Auckland and they wound up in the wrong place after going VMC, then yes, some blame would be attached to the crew - but in this case the VMC starting point was supplied by a third party and it was not the starting point the crew expected, because they third party failed to inform either the crew or the radar station that approved the let-down that the starting point had changed.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 14th Dec 2011 at 15:01.