Who is criminally negligent if an accident occurs in such circumstances?
The Captain? The Operator? The Customer?
The US FAR's have a regulation that says something about "Careless and Reckless operation of an aircraft...." and I am sure the Nanny State does as well.
How have the CAA enforced/interpeted their own regulations re such operations?
When does flying Public Transport over 10- 15 meter seas jconstitute "reckless" operation during public transport operation?
Ok I will bite! Devils advocate -
Is it reckless to fly with sea states higher than the certified sea state for the floats? SS6 being 4-6 metre waves.
- Risk assessment and mitigation. Firstly the risk of ditching is very low. The flotation certification is to provide at least 2 hours of flotation time after ditching. After that the flotation time is not guaranteed and not known. Sensible assessment is that it will not sink immediately. Mitigation - all pax and crew are HUET trained and current, are wearing survival suits with hoods, PLBs and rebreathers. (no rebreathers or STASS for crews yet)
Secondly - it is required here that rescue of 21 people must be possible by whatever means within 120 minutes of the accident being notified. In times of extreme weather the rig captain, rescue boat captain and SAR crew must assess whether this is possible or not. All have their weather limits, and once wave height is more than 4.5 metres the rescue boat cannot be used, so SAR Heli is used as the sole means. Once the wind is beyond their startup limits they will reposition onshore. The captain of the SAR crew must inform the customer and operations if they are not able to meet the 120 minute rescue time. Ops will then stop. The risk is therefore mitigated by the fact that all are trained to escape the aircraft in the event of it capsizing (worst case), and make it into the life rafts. They will then be picked up within 120 minutes which is within the survival time.
In times of extreme weather it is the responsibility of the Daily duty officer to carry out a risk assessment and discuss any additional risk with the customer. They then decide if they are happy to accept the increase in risk.
Legally everything is in order and there is a level of accepted risk - as there always is. We cannot eliminate all risk as you well know, otherwise we would not ever get airborne.
I am not saying I necessarily agree in full with the rationale. There are plenty of holes, and yes I know that the idea of everyone making it into the raft is not guaranteed, nor is the idea that the SAR helicopter will necessarily find everyone if they don't make it into the raft. However this is the reasonable rationale used and accepted risk taken in order to get the job done. Increased risk - yes, reckless - I think a not.
The question we often ask ourselves is what would the BOI conclude if there was an accident today? Who would be blamed? Would there be criminal liability? Was everything reasonably possible done to mitigate the risks involved? The last one being the one that will promote the greatest discussion.
I would draw attention however to JAR-OPS/IEM OPS 3.837 as to how this should be interpreted. It is very clear as to the use of liferafts, but not so clear as to the requirements of floats.
flotation and trim characteristics were evaluated in order to comply with the ditching requirements for certification (See IEM OPS 3.837(a)(2));