The UK AAIB’s report into an erroneous weight-input related takeoff incident recommends the development and requirement for a takeoff performance monitoring system. See
Air Accidents Investigation: Airbus A321-211, G-NIKO
I wonder if such recommendations are somewhat premature before considering possible side effects of such a change, and also as it appears that the contributors to the cause of this event and similar (human related), have not been fully defined or perhaps understood – Australian/French reports.
A takeoff performance monitoring system would require a high level of reliability to avoid unwarranted alerts. Furthermore, presuming that a detection method would compare acceleration / rates, and position, the computational effort could be high and time period required for accurate output, relatively lengthy.
Thus, if an alert was given, it would likely occur in the high speed segment of a takeoff, and possibly further down the runway than would have been expected for a take with a correctly computed weight/speed/thrust level. This could increase the risk of an overrun if the takeoff was rejected – a logical action, as the exact reason for the poor acceleration would not be known.
Therefore use of a takeoff performance monitoring system might introduce additional risk in operations, particularly where aspects of erroneous data entry already have some safe guards, e.g. certification requirements for Vmu, minimum lift off speeds, tailstrike / geometry limits, rotation pitch limit.
Also note
Air Accidents Investigation: Gulfstream G150, D-CKDM a brake related takeoff incident, as might have been the recent Yak 42 accident.