The incorrect shut down of the Kegworth professionally flown plane gives weight to the view that, destructive levels of vibration excluded, a shutdown or feathering on approach is inadvisable.
In the interests of accuracy, the Kegworth shutdown did not occur on the approach. The formal report is available to read at:
http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/formal/gobme/gobmerep.htm
and shows the the failure occurred as the aircraft was in the climb through FL283. The incorrect engine was shut down, and the other throttled back to flight idle. Only shortly after the reapplication of power to the bad engine (as the aircraft turned onto the localiser) did the problem become apparent.
When the aircraft was 13 nm from touchdown on this new heading, and descending to 3,000 feet amsl, ATC advised a right turn to bring the aircraft back to the centreline. At 2020.03 hrs, during this turn, power was increased on the No.1 engine to level the aircraft momentarily at 3,000 feet and maximum indicated vibration was again recorded on the FDR. The aircraft was then cleared to descend to 2000 feet and the commander began a slow descent, calling successively for 2° and then 5° of flap. After joining the centreline, at 2000 feet above ground level (agl), the commander called for the landing gear to be lowered and, as he passed the outer marker at 4.3 nm from touchdown, called for 15° of flap. One minute later, at 2023.49 hrs, when the aircraft was 2.4 nm from touchdown at a height of 900 feet agl, there was an abrupt decrease in power from the No 1 engine.
So here we have a mis-identification (for all sorts of reasons) when the engine was under high power. The results of the misidentification were then masked by the aircraft being throttled back and entering into a descent to land at a nearby airport. The signs of the misidentification only becoming apparent once the aircraft was attempting to apply power on the final stages of the approach.
Interestingly, misidentification of the failed engine is not uncommon in *real life*, amongst professional pilots. The tragic accident that befell the 404 Titan ferrying Airtours aircrew is a good example.
http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/formal/gilgw/gilgw.htm
The report makes sobering reading, particularly if you fly twins regularly, and your only experience of having to identify an "engine failure" is on your annual MEP renewal, when the engine conveniently fails totally, quickly and cleanly.