TM et al, the story is a excellent example of a ‘total’ flying solution; real management. In addition to excellent physical flying skills necessary to execute the chosen option, there were skills of assessment and understanding to judge the severity of the situation. Also, there were decision skills enabling the selection of the course of action, although the article does not explain how or on what basis this was achieved; this begs the question ‘what is expertise’.
This ‘total’ view encompasses much of what is missing in modern aviation. As much as individuals attempt to maintain proficiency, the physical skills will deteriorate as fewer opportunities and organizational constraints continue to reduce the base standard.
Similarly for thinking skills. Although the need for situation assessment and decision making skills remains high or more so in modern ‘managed’ aviation, these too are being eroded. Also, there may be even less opportunity or motivation to maintain proficiency in the soft skills in an ‘automatic’ world. These skills may not have been taught, or there is reduced opportunity for experience in use, which is a necessary part of their effectiveness. In addition, the industry is becoming more controlled, constrained, SOP dependent, and there is a looming threat of retribution, job loss and litigation.
I compare the story with the recent Hudson ditching accident. Many commentators cite that only that pilot (or one with similar, high ability) could have accomplished the landing in the Hudson. This is a cursory view; all type qualified pilots would have had the physical flying skills to complete the approach and landing. However, if we consider how many of those pilots would have decided to choose that course of action (IMHO a much reduced number), and then the number of pilots in that subset who would have made the decision in time to execute the chosen option (even fewer), then the extent of industry’s skills shortfall becomes obvious.
Accidents similar to this and the focus on the more generic problems of loss of control result in calls for more manual flying to improve the skill level; in most cases this overlooks the shortfall in soft skills.
Is it practical for the industry to attempt to ‘retrain’ pilots to the old skills level whilst there are still skills shortfalls in the requirements for modern operations? Furthermore, it would be unrealistic to expect the retrained ‘old’ skills to be remembered in rare, abnormal situations if these skills are not exercised on a regular basis as in ‘the old days’.
It may be time for the industry to consider the status quo. There is a need for modern management skills (predominantly soft skills) and these have to be exercised to maintain proficiency. What is within these skills and the associated training which could be used to ensure that crews have an appropriate response in the rare abnormal situations. What more should/could be trained; would this be cost effective, or does the exposure to abnormal situations have to be limited – higher reliability systems or constraints on operating situations?
We need the exemplars from the old stories, but we might not be able to achieve those same standards or the necessary proficiency and experience levels. We have to look at the current stories, the good and not so, in order to assess what is required and what might be practical.