Quote:
Originally Posted by
Machinbird
The feedback channel he had used all his flying career was no longer available. He was operating open loop.
Originally Posted by Clandestino
That would be very damning, if found true. Proper way to perform instrument flying in civil aeroplane is by visual reference to instruments, not to column/stick position. Taught from day one of IR training. That's why no one made a fuss about non-backdriven sticks on Airbus. At least no one not anonymous.
Not really. This is really a Human Factors type evaluation of what the PF had to work with while using his mayonnaise stirring stick technique, and only applies while in a stall. He is not supposed to be in a stall, but it appears that mayonnaise stirring is a particularly bad control technique while in a stall. That might be a lesson we can take from this.
Originally Posted by Clandestino
Protections are lost because there is no simple way to compute whether airspeed or AoA is wrong.
I'll bet there are quite a few engineers that do not agree.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Machinbird
A crew not recognizing a stall! That just should not happen. Particularly with the amount of time they had at their disposal to recover.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
GarageYears
But what was really "wrong"? Training. Training. Training
Originally Posted by Clandestino
While I might agree, I'd advise caution not to slip into conjecture. First 3 reports are heavy on technical side while HF side is seemingly neglected, which comes as no surprise to me as it is much more difficult and time consuming part of the investigation. Human are not machines, which sometimes comes as mixed blessing. While aeroplane doesn't care what time of day it is, human beings tend to perform better at 10:00 AM than 04:00.
Even the BEA seems to hold the viewpoint espoused by Garage Years and myself:
Consequently, the BEA recommends:
that EASA review the content of check and training programmes and make
mandatory, in particular, the setting up of specific and regular exercises dedicated
to manual aircraft handling of approach to stall and stall recovery, including at
high altitude
.
I've been trying to pin down what specific training in my background convinces me that I would recognize the stall in the same situation that the AF447 crew faced.
The two factors are:
- Having read D. P. Davies description of the deceptive nature of the stall in a relatively level attitude.
- Having spent time maneuvering swept wing aircraft to their performance limits. (This has already saved my posterior on more than one occasion. Once was in a puddle jumper.)