All bolding by me
DozyWannabe
But this crew in the wee hours appeared not to notice a Stall Warning that was blaring in their ears for nearly a minute. By the time the AoA values became invalid, the situation was pretty grim - what chance they'd notice the warning you suggest?
Was the stall warning not noticed, noticed but not formally announced, noticed and not formally announced and not successfully reacted upon?
Let´s look at BEA Interim report 3: (bolding by me)
BEA IR3 Page 74 3rd para
At 2 h 10 min 10, the PF’s nose-up inputs increased the angle of attack and the stall warning triggered twice transitorily. Probably in reaction to this warning, the PNF exclaimed “what is that?”
.
BEA IR3 P75 6th para
At 2 h 10 min 51, ........... Five seconds later, probably in reaction to the stall warning, the PF pushed the thrust levers towards the TO/GA detent and called it out. It was at about that time that the airplane exited its flight envelope.
BEA IR3 P 76 1st para
A little after 2 h 11 min 30, the PF said twice that he had lost control of the airplane.
BEA IR3 page 76 3rd para
At around 2 h 11 min 42, the Captain came back into the cockpit, a very short time before the stall warning stopped. ........ Neither of the two copilots gave him a precise summary of the problems encountered nor of the actions undertaken, except that they had lost control of the airplane and that they had tried everything.
BEA assumes, that both stall warnings had been recognized and honoured by an action (although not successfull ones), and the PF admitted twice and the PF and PNF stated to the captain, that they had lost control of the aircraft, which could be a term to describe the fallout of the stalled situation.
BEA IR3 page 76 7th para
At around 2 h 11 min 42, the Captain came back into the cockpit, a very short time before the stall warning stopped...................Neither of the two copilots formally identified the stall situation that the airplane was in, either via the aural warning, or by recognising the buffet, or by interpreting the high vertical speed and pitch attitude values. It should be noted that buffet is the only indication of the approach to stall at high altitude on other airplanes whose stall warning threshold does not vary with the Mach.
We have to consider that BEA had made up its mind concerning this issue. The crew probably reacted to the stall warnings and admitted to have lost control, but
did not formally announce stall to each other and also not to the captain.
DozyWannabe (bolding by me for reference)
We know the ADI on the LHS was OK from the DFDR, and the ISIS seems to have been OK too, otherwise the Captain would not have pointed it out.
BEA IR3 P76 3rd para
Neither of the two copilots gave him a precise summary of the problems encountered nor of the actions undertaken, except that they had lost control of the airplane and that they had tried everything. In reaction, the Captain said several times “take that”, doubtless speaking of the FPV (time 02:12:52
I could not find your claim, that the captain was pointing to the ISIS, but i might have overlooked it in the report. Can you point me to it?
Edit: Thank you DW, found it with your help!
The following two quotes are for the one / ones, who still think(s) that instruments tell it all.
BEA IR3 P 76 8th para
In the absence of relevant information from the copilots, reading the information available on the screens (pitch attitude, roll, thrust, vertical speed, altitude, etc…) was not sufficient in itself for the Captain to become rapidly aware of the airplane’s situation. He did not then ask questions that could have helped him to understand the sequence of events.
Some say, he would have understood better without asking, if he would have been able to observe a full NU control input together with the instruments.
BEA IR3 P 76 last para
Despite several references to the altitude, which was falling, none of the three crew members seemed to be able to determine which information to rely on: for them, the pitch attitude, rolland thrust values could seem inconsistent with the vertical speed and altitude values.
And that one for the audio channel:
BEA IR3 P76 9th para
The stall warning lasted 54 seconds continuously, during which time neither of the copilots made any reference to it. It is likely that the Captain heard this warning a few moments before coming back into the cockpit, but it is also likely that the multiple starts and stops added to the confusion and disturbed his diagnosis of the situation.
franzl