Diagnostic
Thank you for your courteous response.
I agree that Dr Bainbridge's paper is very valuable in this respect but feel that with good training and professionalism such an effect can be mitigated if not totally avoided. Pilots should not really freeze and lose control if an aircraft does what it is designed to. However, as realistic training as possible is the key hear and this may well be lacking. Hard training, easy execution as the saying goes. From my studies of previous airline company cultural issues I think that automation is the way to go but there are caveats as you observe.
Whilst you are correct about the hypothetical nature of my comments on yokes I feel that the balance of probabilities bears it out. Given the actions of the flight crew that night and that the PNF did take some ineffective action before calling the captain I cannot think that a different input method would have changed things. I also think that the PNF comments 2:10:26 to 2:10:36 where he tells the PF to go back down three times are highly significant and indicate an awareness derived from his instruments. The PNF also warns the PF (2:11) to 'touch the lateral controls as little as possible' once again indicating an awareness of what is happening. I would suggest that a yoke whilst not making the awareness worse it wouldn't have made it any better.