Originally Posted by
DozyWannabe
Originally Posted by airtren
There is progress, with the extending of the lack of perfection to "aircraft" and "systems" from "software" and "design"..
What does that even mean? You're starting to sound like bearfoil again.
So now what? you now realize what it means, and you're taking it back?
You went from saying that "design" and "software" are not perfect, to "systems" and "aircraft" are not perfect, and when I make a note of the progression, and progress, you're asking me what it means?
How does that sound? I would say just like yourself.
Have you reflected, thought, been aware what it means when you said what you've said?
.....
Can you clarify your statement of the Airbus "design" problem with the pitot tubes, per my earlier request?
Or is just a throw in the air, as you know well that the "pitot tubes" are already "done deal", and there is nothing to loose, or gain, by saying what you're saying?
You're answering with a question? You've mentioning betting, its yours, you want someone else to give your words their worth?
Originally Posted by
DozyWannabe
That the industry has a bad habit of "regulating by counting tombstones" is an uncomfortable truth, butthe point I was trying to make was that in the vast majority of those cases, the Airbus flight deck layout was more than enough to effect a recovery and arrive at their destination in one piece even if, as Diagnostic says, mistakes were made in the initial handling. That says to me that the design works at leas tas well as any alternative as far as the mission as a whole is concerned.
If there is anything wrong with the industry counting the tomb stones as an indication when there is time to get serious, is that it waited way too long, not that it takes actions, when there are fatalities.
You're clearly wrong, as based on your badge, you're not willing to admit that an airplane full of passenger casualties didn't happen earlier by pure luck, or science of statistics, and that there is a very simple and obvious factor in the cockpit that made it more difficult to isolate immediately the mistakes and correct them, as to prevent the loss of 228 lives, a factor that is recognized by other airline manufacturers, and by other industries.
You'll be surprised to note that I disagree emphatically. If you compare the CVRs. both the Birgenair F/O and the AF447 PNF were well aware that the aircraft was not being handled correctly, but instead of taking control, kept making suggestions to the handling pilot. In the case of AF447, it would appear that the PNF was waiting for the Captain's approval to take control from the PF, and in the case of Birgenair the PF making a hash of it *was* the Captain.
No, the PNF had a suspicion, a guess, a hunch, but never knew, couldn't know for sure, with 100% confidence, which is why he could not tell the Captain, when the Captain rejoined the cockpit what's going on, why, and how things got there.
We have the PF's SS actions on the FDR traces, and we are in such a comfortable spot to be able to say what is wrong with those SS actions, as the traces clearly tell us.
But you're not willing to admit, that one of the reasons the Captain failed until the end, like the PNF, to see exactly what those actions were, is what is so obvious to many - the lack of visual contact, the lack of ability to see the positioning of the stick, and the actions on the SS, which yes, is "a virtual secrecy" created for the direct PF actions on the SS, for those that are in the cockpit.
Originally Posted by airtren
There is more in your queue that need processing.
I'm not going to be CONF's monkey, and I'm certainly not going to be yours.
You would be your monkey, as your input queue is yours, and the responsibility to manage it properly is yours.
I'm not trying to help Airbus, I'm trying to get to the bottom of the issues behind the accident,...
Really?
Per your own posts, you're trying hard to influence and control this Forum, as to guide it into the belief that the only problem with the airplane is the problem known well before the accident - the pitot tubes - and that the ample data provided by this accident show no problem with it.
You would have to do a lot to change the credibility perception for statements like the one I just made.
and rehashing 20-year-old arguments about computers in the cockpit, yokes and feedback are getting in the way of that.
I have no idea what was the discussion or problems pointed out were years ago. I looked at the AF 447, case and data, with no dog on the track, and what's obvious is there obvious. The fact that similar discussions existed before, is just an indication that the problem existed from day one.