Originally Posted by
airtren
There is progress, with the extending of the lack of perfection to "aircraft" and "systems" from "software" and "design".. .
What does that even mean? You're starting to sound like bearfoil again.
How much?
On #1, "Diagnostic" has pointed out well and sufficiently the issues with it.
How many more casualties are necessary? to consider everything that may be a weak point important, or a “big deal”?
That the industry has a bad habit of "regulating by counting tombstones" is an uncomfortable truth, butthe point I was trying to make was that in the vast majority of those cases, the Airbus flight deck layout was more than enough to effect a recovery and arrive at their destination in one piece even if, as Diagnostic says, mistakes were made in the initial handling. That says to me that the design works at leas tas well as any alternative as far as the mission as a whole is concerned.
On #2, You're simply making my point about the SS location and virtual secrecy problem, and that of the "yoke" supporters, which is that the F/O saw quickly and understood well what was wrong. Why he didn't intervene is a completely different matter.
You'll be surprised to note that I disagree emphatically. If you compare the CVRs. both the Birgenair F/O and the AF447 PNF were well aware that the aircraft was not being handled correctly, but instead of taking control, kept making suggestions to the handling pilot. In the case of AF447, it would appear that the PNF was waiting for the Captain's approval to take control from the PF, and in the case of Birgenair the PF making a hash of it *was* the Captain.
On #3, So what? I recall that others on this Forum refuted this point a while back, and you still think it is a "reason". Furthermore, you should know this if you have the expertise you've advertised: the approval of a tester cannot make a product, which is tested within certain limits, bug free!!!
No-one ever said it was bug-free, it simply passes the certification requirements on reliability that the non-digital predecessors of the instrumentation had to pass. I don't recall being "refuted" either, so if you'd care to furnish me with an example, I'll catch up.
You should here[sic] what system architects from various industries say, about the "lack of visibility/virtual secrecy" of the A330 cockpit, and how this becomes an example of a typical bad choice for the control center of a critical mission system.
What systems architects? Show me. I can cast-iron guarantee you that you'll find just as many - if not more - who say the system is fine. You keep using the phrase "virtual secrecy", and I do not think it means what you think it means.
So, you had your self assumed badge for about 9 years? I've joined in July 2011, and your ""anti-Airbus brigade" defense badge" is outshining anything else that I could notice of similar nature.
Blow me down if I'm not being judged on 9 years of contributions based on 4 months of an occasionally heated discussion on one incident - and you accuse *me* of extrapolation!
In any case, the people I'm talking about materialised around 2004 and they blanketed any Airbus related thread with links to the website of one Norbert Jacquet, and later Henri Cornus - both former Air France Captains-turned-internet cranks who blame Airbus for the loss of their jobs and prestige. Some melted away over time, some are still around.
As, I said before, I think you should reflect on this: do you really think Airbus needs this type of help?
I'm not trying to help Airbus, I'm trying to get to the bottom of the issues behind the accident, and rehashing 20-year-old arguments about computers in the cockpit, yokes and feedback are getting in the way of that. The reason most of the more esteemd members of this board gave up on this subject months ago is because it always comes back to the same old same old. I only bother because I don't want to see Jacquet- and Cornus-sourced misinformation reprinted in the national press, whose journalists clearly know no better.
There is more in your queue that need processing.
I'm not going to be CONF's monkey, and I'm certainly not going to be yours.
Originally Posted by
Clandestino
2. Once upon a time there was a certain senior training captain who was smiling from the airline advertisements. Once he made a beginner's mistake of taking off without clearance. So died. Took 582 people with him. Do we call him non-pilot for that?
And, lest we forget, his fellow countrymen and pilots so categorically refused to believe that their premier pilot could make such an elementary mistake that they tried to blame the controllers (based on their assertion that they heard a word that sounded a bit like "futbol" on the ATC tape, which none of the other investigators heard), and the crew of the other aircraft involved (based on the fact that they did not turn off at the C3 exit, which was a practically impossible turn for a jumbo to execute, and elected to use C4 instead). To this day, the Dutch report still makes these assertions.